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Summary
This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist
organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues
of potential concern to Congress.  The terrorist organizations included are those
designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”
(For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO
List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS
Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are:
     
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
‘Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
Hizballah (Party of God)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
National Liberation Army (ELN — Colombia)
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al Qaeda
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)]
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL)
United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)
Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002.  (Some
spellings have been altered.)
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Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Name(s).  Fatah — Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades,
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black June and Black September.
Goals and Objectives.  ANO’s goal is to destroy the state of Israel and
establish a Palestinian state.
Brief History. The ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al- Banna whose nom
de guerre, Abu Nidal, means “father of the struggle.” Abu Nidal was a high-ranking
official in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and served as PLO
representative to several Arab states.  Abu Nidal bitterly opposed the idea of a
Palestinian state co-existing with an Israeli state and after the PLO began leaning
towards reconciliation with the Jewish state, he split with the group to form the
ANO.
The ANO was once one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations
in the world.1  Its operations, which included kidnapping, murders, bombings and
hijackings, have killed approximately 900 people and injured several hundred more
across three continents and 20 countries.2  Over the years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya each
reportedly harbored Abu Nidal and often hired the ANO to execute attacks that were
in their interests.3  As a result, the ANO’s selection of targets has been diverse and
inconsistent, depending largely on the demands of the state sponsor.
The ANO has targeted Jews  both inside and outside of Israel, but also targeted
moderate Palestinians and Arabs who supported peace talks with Israel.  ANO is
responsible for the assassinations of senior Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah
outside the embassy in Beirut in 1994,4 Abu Iyyad, the PLO’s second-in-command
in 1991, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah in 1991.5
The group is also known for simultaneous attacks on Israeli airline counters in Rome
and Vienna which killed 18 people and injured 111. In August 2002 Abu Nidal
reportedly killed himself in his apartment in Baghdad where he was being treated for
leukemia.  However, the multiple gunshot wounds to his head leave unanswered
CRS-2
6 “Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.
7 “Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002
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Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.  Also accessible at [http//www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/].
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questions surrounding his apparent suicide.6 The extent to which the ANO is still
active is under debate.
Favored Tactics.  Its operations include kidnapping, murders, bombings and
hijackings.
Anti-American Activities.  While the ANO sometimes targeted Western
interests, there is only one incident in which it directly targeted a U.S.  interest.  On
July 22, 1985, ANO attempted to bomb the U.S.  embassy in Cairo but failed.
Primary Area(s) of Operation. From1974-1980, ANO headquarters were
based in Baghdad, where the group reportedly took direction from the Iraqi
administration to carry out attacks against primarily Syrian and PLO targets.  The
ANO later relocated to Syria, then Libya, and finally Lebanon.7  Today, ANO
militants reportedly reside in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, but over the
years, the group’s activities have reached far beyond the confines of its state
sponsors.8  When the ANO was active in the 1970s and 1980s, it executed attacks in
20 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Italy, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.
Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the ANO
consists of a few hundred members.9
Connections with Other Groups.  The ANO does not appear to be
connected with any other group.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  The ANO received
funding and logistical assistance from several state supporters throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, including Iraq, Syria and Libya.10     
Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  October
8, 1997.
Re-Designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Interest to Congress.  The mysterious circumstances of Abu
Nidal’s death beg some questions.  If it was a murder, published speculation spans
from the killers being agents of Saddam Hussein seeking to eliminate any ties the
regime may have had to terrorist groups, to the murderers being henchman of Yasir
CRS-3
11 “Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.
Arafat carrying out revenge for the murders of PLO officials by Abu Nidal.11  In
addition, the viability of ANO as a terrorist organization is up for debate; some might
question whether it should continue on the designated foreign terrorist organization
list.  Third, it is unclear what impact the sanctions imposed on the ANO had or are
having on state sponsorship for the group.
Other CRS Products.
CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.
CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June10, 2002.
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.
CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.
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Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations,
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(continued...)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Names(s).  Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG
Goals and Objectives.  Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the
Philippines.   Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority
Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern
islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago.  Most claim, however,  that since the
late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial
gain.12
Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the
Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.  Returning to the Philippines in
1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of
Philippine Islamic radicalism,  to continue the cause there.13  In 1998, Janjalani was
killed in a shootout with police in Basilan.  Since then, a single strong leader has not
emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated
commands led by the personal power of individual leaders.  Khaddafi Janjalani,
Abubakar’s brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and
the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.14
  
In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions
of Filipino Christians.  In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to
kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom
payments.15  In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French
journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.16  In
May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu
Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans
(see below). 
In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the
ASG.  In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President




18  CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 9-13.
19 Bradley Graham, “Hostage Dies, Wife Is Freed In Rescue; U.S. Missionaries Held 1 Year
by Rebels,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2002.
20 Raymond Bonner and Eric Schmitt, “Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set with U.S.
Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader,” The New York Times, September 22, 2002, p. NE16; and
Mark Lerner, “Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal,” The Washington Times,
April 26, 2002, p. A15; cited in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by
Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003,
p. 11.
21  CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 12.
troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under
strict rules of engagement negotiated in June.  Troop strength rose to around 1,300
at the height of operations.  The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include:
increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG
strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG
from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the
rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population’s support
for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects.18  The majority of U.S. forces
withdrew by July 31, 2002.
Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted
bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings.   
Anti-American Activities.  In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of
20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California
and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas.  In
June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero,  had
beheaded him.  In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based
on American intelligence.  Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were
killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued.19  The three Americans were apparently
held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush
Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from
the Burnham family.  The couple was not released after the payment was made.20
Areas of Operation.  ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of
Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there.  In
2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an
extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has
been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.21
Strength and Composition.  The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim
radicals.  The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500
CRS-6
22  U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 102.
23  CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
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2003.
26  U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,pp. 101-102.
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Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 6.
28 Ibid., p. 3.
29  U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.
members.22  According to the Philippine government, the group’s strength reached
1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.23
That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and
military assistance from the United States to around 450.24  The group maintains its
own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between
island bases. 
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  Links between ASG
and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate.  It is generally believed that the group
received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal
Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden.  Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef
operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf
fighters.  However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al
Qaeda and ASG.  Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda,
but others contend that because of the group’s blatant use of ransom and extortion for
profit, a close association between the two is unlikely.25  The 2002 edition of the U.S.
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al
Qaeda.26
Though Janjalani’s first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the
separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)  and the MNLF, deny having links
with Abu Sayyaf.  Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on
civilians and its profiteering.  The Philippine military, however, has claimed that
elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.27
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains
most of its financing through ransom and extortion.  One report estimated its
revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million.28
According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic
benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia.29  “Libya was a conduit for ransoms
paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money
CRS-7
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for ‘livelihood projects’ in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the
possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf.”30
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  The presence of U.S. troops in the
Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war
on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign
counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism.  Congressional
oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important.
Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist
group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs.  If the latter,
then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question.  The issue of the
ASG’s ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here.  The role of Libya in providing  ransom
money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should
be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j)
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as
amended)).  Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and
MNLF is ambiguous and controversial.  Given the importance of the Philippines as
an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching.    
Other CRS Reports.
CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, October 21, 2003.
CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by Regina
Dubey, Huda Allen, Amanda Douglas, updated August 8, 2003.
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.  
CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard
Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.  
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.  
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Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Name(s).  al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion
Goals and Objectives.  Al-Aqsa aims to expel Israeli soldiers and settlers
from the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state.
Brief History.   Al-Aqsa is an offshoot of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, and emerged
just after the start of the second Intifada in September 2000.  The organization’s
goals are to create a Palestinian state and eliminate the presence of Israeli soldiers
and settlers in the Palestinian- occupied territories.  The group is secular in theory,
but has been known to recruit young militants espousing Islamic fundamentalism.31
  
Unlike Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa does not claim to be intent
on destroying the state of Israel.32  Initially, al-Aqsa militants exclusively attacked
Israeli Defense Force and Israeli settlers, but experts say that by early 2002 al- Aqsa
began targeting civilians in Israel.33  This shift may have been due to the heightened
intensity of the Intifada, including the increased death toll of Palestinians and what
al- Aqsa militants believe to be Israel’s “targeted killing” of the group’s West Bank
leader, Raed Karmi, on January 14, 2002.34  Since then, al-Aqsa’s attacks have
become more severe, and in January 2002 the group introduced the use of female
suicide bombers.35  In January 2003, al-Aqsa militants conducted two suicide
bombings in downtown Tel Aviv that killed 23 people and wounded approximately
100. 
 
Since the start of the second Intifada, al-Aqsa militants have executed more
attacks than even Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad36.  While other Palestinian
groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah agreed to observe a cease-fire in June
2003, al-Aqsa refused to do so.  Less than 24 hours after the other groups declared
the cease-fire, al-Aqsa killed a Romanian worker on a settlement road near Jenin in
the West Bank.37       
Favored Tactics. Al-Aqsa uses many tactics, including suicide bombings
(including by women), knifings, shootings, and kidnappings.  
CRS-9
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40 “Israel 1991 to Present; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,” Palestine Facts,
[http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.  
41 Yehuda Lancry, “Letter dated 16 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” January 16, 2002,
accessible at [http://domino.un.org].
42 Yael Shahar, “The al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: A political tool with an edge,” International
Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2002. 
43 “Israel 1991 to Present; al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,” Palestine Facts,
[http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003.  
Anti-American Activities.  Al-Aqsa does not directly target U.S. interests.
However, the State Department has said that at least one U.S. citizen and four U.S.-
Israeli dual citizens have been killed in al-Aqsa attacks.38
Primary Area(s) of Operation.  Al-Aqsa operates in Israel and the
Palestinian Occupied Territories.  The group’s bases are said to be in Nablus and
Ramallah.39
Strength and Composition.  According to the State Department, the number
of members in al-Aqsa is unknown.  Some experts estimate that the group consists
of a few hundred young men and women.40  
Connections with Other Groups. Al-Aqsa’s connection with Yasir
Arafat’s Fatah — the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization — is
murky.  Some Israeli experts and the government itself assert that al- Aqsa is clearly
linked with Yasser Arafat and Fatah.41  They cite as proof Israeli intelligence
acquisition of an apparent al- Aqsa invoice, addressed to the Palestinian Authority
(PA) chief financial officer.  In their view, this intelligence suggests that al- Aqsa
militants are “on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll, [al-Aqsa’s] activities are
financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks are carried out with the
knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat’s inner circle.”42
Al-Aqsa has sometimes cooperated operationally with both Hamas and
Palestinian Jihad.43
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  The source of al-
Aqsa’s funding is unclear.  The sophistication of al- Aqsa attacks suggests that the
group is well funded. Israeli forces claim to have recovered an invoice from a raid on
PLO head Yasir Arafat’s compound in April 2002 that outlines the disbursing of
funds from the PLO to the al-Aqsa Brigades. Israel claims that the invoice
conclusively proves Yassir Arafat’s money supports for the group.  However, Arafat
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has dismissed the “invoice of terror” as a forgery.44  Yasser Arafat has neither
“officially recognized nor openly backed” al- Aqsa.45
Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  Since early 2002, this group has killed
a significant number of civilians in Israel.  Its use of suicide attacks has been
particularly frequent and deadly.  The question of whether or not Yasir Arafat and the
Palestinian Authority provide money for this group (see above) will continue to be
controversial.  This group’s violent activities, and the Israeli response to them, may
continue to affect the viability of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.    
Other CRS Reports.
CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003.  
CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by Kenneth Katzman, updated
June 10, 2002.  
CRS Issue Brief  IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.
CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.  
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Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Name(s).  Armed Islamic Group, GIA
Goals and Objectives.  GIA is a loose-knit radical Islamic organization in
Algeria. While it is unclear whether the group has a central authority or is a collection
of smaller affiliated bands, it apparently seeks to overthrow the secular government
of Algeria and replace it with a fundamentalist state based on Islamic law.
Brief History. GIA formed in early 1993 after the secular Algerian government
cancelled elections apparently because the Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), was poised to win. (GIA split from Islamic Salvation Army, the armed wing
of FIS.)   Returning Algerian veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union
united with disparate radical Islamic groups to form GIA.  Since 1993, the group has
attacked the government and the military, but also conducted brutal massacres of
civilians and foreigners in Algeria, sometimes slaughtering entire villages.  On
December 31, 1997, the group reportedly killed 400 Algerian civilians in a small
town in the space of a few hours.46  Several recent accounts allege, however, that
some massacres may have been conducted by, or with the complicity of, the Algerian
government.47  The group’s activity has diminished because of a military crackdown
and widespread popular revulsion to the killing of civilians.  Since 1998, GIA has
apparently been eclipsed by the better organized though smaller offshoot called
Salafist Group For Call and Combat (GSPC, see below).  
Favored Tactics. GIA is best know for slitting the throats of its victims, but
it has employed a variety of other methods, including bombs, targeted assassinations,
and airline hijackings.
Anti-American Activities.  Although GIA targeted French and other
European interests in both Europe and Algeria, there is only one instance where the
group has directly threatened U.S. interests.  In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a supposed
member of the GIA, was arrested while on route from Canada to bomb the Los
Angeles International Airport.48  
Areas of Operation.  GIA operates mainly within the borders of Algeria.  It
has reportedly raised funds and conducted attacks in Western Europe through
Algerian expatriate communities.   In 2002, a French court convicted two GIA
members for a series of bombings that took place in France in 1995.
Strength and Composition.  GIA’s membership is predominantly Algerian
Islamic militants.   It is difficult to estimate the size of GIA because it is less cohesive
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than many other organizations.  The group’s strength has apparently decreased
substantially from its peak in the mid-1990s, but there is disagreement about the
current number of members.  The State Department estimates that the group’s
strength is now “probably fewer than 100.”49   The International Institute for Strategic
Studies puts its overall strength at “less than 1,500,” divided into cohorts of 50-100.50
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There is evidence of
connections between GIA and Al Qaeda.  In mid-2002, the London-based Arabic
newspaper Al Hayat cited Algerian sources alleging that an Al Qaeda operative
visited Algeria to arrange cooperation between GIA and GSPC.51  In September
2002, a captured GIA leader stated that in the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden provided
financial assistance to GIA.52  It is possible that many Algerian members of Al Qaeda
are or have been associated with GIA.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to Patterns
of Global Terrorism, 2002, GIA has no known sources of external support.53  As
noted above, captured GIA members have asserted that bin Laden provided funding
to GIA in the mid-1990s.  The group reportedly receives aid from Algerian
expatriates in Western Europe and Canada.54
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-Designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  The apparent connections between GIA
and Al Qaeda make this group of particular importance to the United States in the
war on terrorism.  The flow of funding to GIA from expatriates in Western Europe
and Canada raises questions of whether or not efforts to counter terrorist financing
are succeeding.  
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CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated May 23, 2003.
CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
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‘Asbat al-Ansar
Name(s).  ‘Asbat al-Ansar, also spelled ‘Osbat al-Ansar or ‘Usbat al-Ansar,
meaning the “League of Partisans.”
Goals and Objectives.   ‘Asbat al-Ansar aims to establish an Islamic state
in Lebanon and to eliminate anti-Islamic and U.S. influences in Lebanon and
elsewhere.
Brief History.  Established in the 1990s, ‘Asbat al-Ansar is a small, relatively
new, but highly active Sunni extremist group based primarily in the Ain al-Hilweh
Palestinian refugee camp in the southern port of Sidon, Lebanon.  Its leader is Abdel-
Karim al-Saade or Abou Mohjen and the group opposes Lebanon’s representative
government, seeking to replace it with an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law.55
Its constituents, primarily Palestinian refugees, reject peace with Israel.56
‘Asbat al- Ansar targets interests and people that it perceives as “un-Islamic,”
including both soldiers and civilians, Arabs and Westerners.  Churches, bars,
nightclubs, theaters, liquor stores, and casinos have all been attacked by ‘Asbat al-
Ansar militants — as have members of rival militant groups and moderate
government officials.  In 1999, ‘Asbat al-Ansar assailants sprayed gunfire and hurled
grenades at a courthouse in Sidon, killing four Lebanese judges.  In an attack against
an atypical target, in January 2000, militants launched a rocket-propelled grenade at
the Russian embassy in Beirut, reportedly as a gesture of solidarity with the Chechen
rebels.57
Favored Tactics. ‘Asbat al-Ansar militants primarily use small bombs and
grenades to launch attacks against their targets.
Anti-American Activities.  In 2002, ‘Asbat al-Ansar stepped up its attacks
and rhetoric against U.S. targets.  The group is a suspect in the November 2002
killing of Bonnie Penner, an American missionary in Sidon.58  ‘Asbat al-Ansar is
similarly suspected in a string of bombings against U.S. restaurants in Lebanon.59  
Primary Area(s) of Operation. The group is based in Lebanon, primarily in
the ‘Ain al- Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon.  To a large extent, ‘Asbat al-
Ansar is able to reign freely in Lebanon’s refugee camps — without repercussions
from the Lebanese government — because of an Arab League law that stripped
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Lebanon of governmental jurisdiction over the camps.  Hence, the camps — where
several militant and guerilla group such as Fatah and ‘Asbat al- Nour are also said to
be operating — are “off-limits” to Lebanese law enforcement and security officials.60
‘Asbat al-Ansar’s attacks have so far been limited to targets in Lebanon.
Strength and Composition. The group consists of approximately 300
militants, mostly Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.61
Connections with Other Groups. Experts suspect that ‘Asbat al-Ansar is
affiliated with Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.62 The allegation  hinges
on the connection of an  Australian of Lebanese origin named Bilal Khazal who
apparently forms a link between Asbat al-Ansar, the Tripoli Cell, and Al Qaeda.
Khazal heads Australia’s Islamic Youth Movement that is accused of recruiting
Islamic fundamentalists.  The CIA claims that “the Al Qaeda leadership has allegedly
delegated responsibility”63 to Khazal, and the Australian press claims “Bilal Khazal
has been linked to an alleged Spanish Al Qaeda operative Abu Dahdah, who is
accused of having strong links with one of the brains behind the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks.”64  
A group known as the Tripoli Cell attempted to assassinate U.S. Ambassador
to Lebanon Vincent Battle in January 2003.  Arrested members of the Tripoli Cell
admitted to also being Asbat al-Ansar members and reportedly told a military court
in Beirut that the group’s leader, Mohammed Ka’aki “received at least $1,800 from
Khazal.”65 Some experts believe, then, that Khazal may have formed the linchpin
between Asbat al-Ansar, through the Tripoli Cell, to Al Qaeda, although this is
subject to dispute. 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department
says that ‘Asbat al- Ansar likely receives aid from extremist Sunni groups as well as
Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.66 
Date added to the FTO list. March 27, 2002.
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group threatens the Lebanese
government, rejects peace with Israel and also reportedly  tried to assassinate the U.S.
Ambassador to Lebanon (see above).  It may also have ties to Al Qaeda.  Within the
context of the war on terrorism, it bears watching in future months.  
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CRS Report IB91137, Carol Migdalovitz, The Middle East Peace Talks, updated
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Prados, updated August 7, 2001.
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Name(s). Aum Supreme Truth (Aum), Aum Shinrikyo (means “teaching the
supreme truth” on the “powers of destruction and creation in the universe”), Aleph
Goals and Objectives.  Aum aimed to control Japan and the world, and
subsequently create a global utopian society.
Brief History. Established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, an eccentric, half-blind
intellectual, Aum reflects an eclectic and twisted blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu,
Taoist and Christian thought.  It focuses on spiritual existence in a world that its
adherents view as increasingly hedonistic, superficial and materialistic.  Asahara
claimed that the state of the world indicated that apocalypse was nearing and would
begin with a U.S. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on Japan. His group
sought to hasten that apocalypse, take over Japan and the globe, and herald a new
order from chaos.67  
To this end, Aum sought to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
capabilities.68  On June 27, 1994 Aum released the nerve agent, sarin, over a district
in central Japan, killing seven people and injuring hundreds.  In its deadliest and most
infamous attack, on March 20, 1995, ten Aum followers punctured bags of diluted
sarin in five subway stations located under government offices and the National
Police Agency’s headquarters.  Twelve people were killed and up to 6,000 were
injured.69   In response, Japanese security forces arrested Aum followers, including
Asahara, and closed laboratories and production facilities.  Nine members of the
group have since been sentenced to death and Asahara continues to stand trial.  A
verdict is expected in Asahara’s trial in February 2004.
The group has renamed itself “Aleph,” meaning beginning, and is under the new
leadership of Fumihiro Joyu.70   It has issued a public apology and promised at least
$2.5 million in reparations for victims of the attack.71  It has also renounced violence
in the political and spiritual processes.  Although the group has not been associated
with any terrorist act since 1995, Japanese officials are still concerned, saying that
it is ‘no less dangerous than it was seven years ago.’72  Security forces closely
monitor the group’s activities, and under new legislation, are permitted to conduct
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raids of Aum facilities.   The group has reportedly renewed its recruiting activities,
disseminating videos and posting web pages in Japanese, English and Russian.73
Favored Tactics.  Aum has used chemical weapons against civilian and
government targets.  In 1993 the group attempted to spread anthrax from one of its
facilities in Tokyo, and in 1995 Aum punctured bags of sarin with umbrellas in the
Tokyo subway that killed 12 and injured up to 6,000.74 According to one source,
“Members had tried on no fewer than eight different occasions between 1990 and
1995 to aerosolize anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin at locations around
Tokyo.”75  According to some experts, Aum produced or acquired enough sarin to
kill an estimated 4.2 million people.76
Anti-American Activities. Aum has not targeted Americans or U.S. interests
in the past.  However, Asahara often preached anti-American rhetoric to his
constituents, including the sentiment that the United States was at fault for Japan’s
economic and social ills.77
Primary Area(s) of Operation.  Aum has solely attacked targets in Japan,
but its followers and its administrative offices extend beyond Japan.  Analysts
suspect that Aum once maintained offices in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United States.78  There are still reportedly a large number
of members of Aleph in Russia.
Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that Aum
currently consists of 1,500 to 2,000 followers.79  Some experts say that at its peak, the
group had 60,000 followers, including 10,000 in Japan, as many as twenty to thirty
thousand in Russia, and an additional ten to twenty thousand worldwide.80  As
recently as August 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church has claimed there are more
Aum members in Russia than in Japan.81 Aum’s spiritual message has appealed to
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young, well-educated individuals characterized as “alienated by society’s
preoccupation with work, success, technology and making money.”82
Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Reportedly owning
nearly $1.4 billion in assets, Aum has proven itself to be a wealthy and self-reliant
group.83  It operates a computer store that reportedly generates annual sales of
approximately 7 billion yen (about $63 million).84 It has been reported that Aum’s
computer businesses have been highly lucrative because dedicated cult followers
work for little or no wages, allowing Aum to undersell its competitors.  The
sophisticated technical capabilities of many members of Aum give this group the
ability to generate robust sources of funds.  In addition to high-tech goods, the cult
generates revenue through sales of publications and spiritual goods.85 
Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  Aum was the first terrorist group to have
used so-called weapons of mass destruction.  The group’s willingness to use
chemical and biological weapons makes it of special concern, especially considering
that Japanese authorities are still very wary of the group’s intentions and that it
continues to exist.  
With a reportedly large contingent of followers in Russia and the group’s past
record of recruiting educated scientists, attention might be focused on whether
Aum/Aleph is seeking to use its Russian members to acquire more weapons and
resources from Russian facilities. 
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Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Name(s).  Basque Fatherland and Liberty; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA
Goals and Objectives. ETA aims to establish a Basque homeland based on
Marxist principles in the ethnically Basque areas in northern Spain and southwestern
France.  
Brief History.  ETA was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist rebels incensed
by the efforts of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to suppress the Basque language
and culture.  Since then the group has carried out numerous attacks in Spain and
some in France.  More than 800 people have been killed in ETA attacks since its
founding.86  The group is best known for assassinating high level Spanish officials.
In 1973, the group assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the heir apparent to
Franco, and in 1995 Spanish politician and now president Jose Maria Aznar narrowly
escaped an attack.  Spanish King Juan Carlos was also the target of an unsuccessful
plot.  In addition, the group has targeted lower-level officials, journalists, and
civilians.87  
In the past two years, the Spanish government has made important
breakthroughs against ETA, arresting over 120 suspected members and accomplices,
seizing assets, and disrupting planned operations.  France has also recently arrested
a number of suspected members.  ETA apparently does not enjoy broad support
among Basques: often its attacks are followed by anti-violence demonstrations, and
moderate political parties that reject violence do much better at polls than do parties
supportive of ETA.88  In general, ETA seems to be declining: the number of attacks
and killings has fallen (from 43 in 2001 to 20 in 2002), its financial assets appear to
have been squeezed through international cooperation, and  its reported IRA
collaboration has been hurt by the Irish group’s cease fire.89
 
Favored Tactics.  ETA has conducted bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and
assassinations. 
Anti-American Activities. ETA has not been known to target Americans or
U.S. interests.
Areas of Operation. ETA operates mainly in the Basque regions of Spain and
France which include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya.  The group has also
carried out attacks throughout Spain.
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Strength and Composition.  The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of
Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates ETA’s strength at several hundred members, plus
supporters.90
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The group apparently
has links to the Irish Republican Army, and some believe that it has often followed
the IRA’s lead in terms of tactics and operations.91  Terrorism experts believe that
ETA may also have helped Colombian terrorists to bomb a social club in Bogota in
early 2003.92
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  ETA members have
reportedly received training in Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Nicaragua, as well as
sanctuary in Cuba.  The ETA finances itself through kidnappings, robberies, and
extortion.93  The group has been known to rob banks, traffic in drugs, and extort
money from businesses in the Basque regions.94
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  The measures taken by the United States
and its allies to freeze ETA resources have apparently had an effect upon funding for
the group.  While some Basques in the United States have sympathy for Basque self-
determination, it does not appear that expatriates in the U.S. are providing resources
for the violent activities of the ETA.  Some terrorism experts point to Spanish
government measures in dealing with the ETA, especially in recent years, as a case
study of effective state counterterrorism, although not all would agree.  Others are
concerned about the very hard political line that has been taken against further
Basque autonomy, including against moderates who are not engaged in violence.
Recent cooperation between France and Spain in dealing with the ETA, as well as
measures  instituted by the European Union, are arguably an example of effective
transnational counterterrorism.  
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Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army 
Name(s). Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA).
Goals and Objectives.  To establish a Marxist state in the Philippines via a
violent uprising against the Philippine government. 
Brief History. The New People’s Army (NPA) is the military wing of the
Communist Party of the Philippines.  It was established in 1969 by Jose Sison and
is recognized as Southeast Asia’s longest-running Marxist insurgency.95 This Marxist
group has remained active over the course of 34 years in spite of major shifts in
global politics, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new
ideological players such as Al Qaeda.  In June 2003, the NPA executed its deadliest
attack in more than a decade when 200 of its militants raided a Philippine army
camp, killing 17 people.96  In response, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo condemned the attack and ordered an urgent crackdown on the group.  Prior
to this attack, the Philippine government had tried twice to engage the group in peace
talks.  Peace talks were in progress in 2001, but were halted after the NPA
assassinated two Philippine congressman. Talks were resumed in 2003, but NPA
rebels rejected a peace accord with the government, claiming that they are under
extreme duress after being listed on European and U.S. terrorist lists.97 
Favored Tactics. The NPA primarily targets Philippine citizens and interests.
It has been known to use a variety of methods, including kidnapping, assassinations,
and arson.  It also has front groups in the labor and university sectors of Philippine
society.
Anti-American Activities. The NPA was responsible for attacks against U.S.
military interests in the Philippines prior to the closure of the U.S. military bases
there (Clark and Subic) in 1992.  Since then, the NPA has continued to oppose the
presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and has demanded that the U.S. military
stay out of domestic affairs.  In 2002, the NPA objected to being designated a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) and threatened retaliatory attacks against Americans
and U.S. interests.  In 2003, the NPA threatened to target U.S. troops in the
Philippines who have been participating in a joint military exercise to train Philippine
soldiers with the skills to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group.98
CRS-23
99 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002,  p 106.
100 Ibid. See also Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels
following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003.
101  CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin,
Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003. See also Jim Gomez,
“Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press,
March 30, 2003. 
102 Honesto C. General, “Is CPP/NPA a terrorist organization?,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 18, 2002. 
Primary Area(s) of Operation. The NPA operates solely in the Philippines,
particularly in rural Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.  It also reportedly has cells in
Manila.99
Strength and Composition. The NPA consists of 10,000 to 13,500
members.100  According to the State Department, the group had reached an armed
strength of over 25,000 in mid-1985. The NPA went into a steep decline due to
Corazon Aquino’s restoration of democracy, more effective Philippine military
operations, and, perhaps most decisive, internal divisions and purges within the
Communist Party in the context of the international decline of their ideology.  By
1993-94, NPA strength fell to an estimated 5,000.  Since then, however, there has
been slow growth up to an estimated 11,000 members.  The reasons for the
resurgence appear to be continued economic hardships in the rural areas and the
restoration of a more monolithic leadership of the Communist Party (CPP) under the
exiled Jose Sison.101  Sison and other CPP leaders are living in the Netherlands.
Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. NPA raises money
through several mechanisms.  It reportedly collects “revolutionary taxes” from rural
communities by taxing food and other items.102  The group also raises money by
engaging in criminal activities such as extortion.  Philippine officials estimate that
the group gathers about $1.8 million each year.
Originally Designated as an FTO. August 9, 2002.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group is a threat to a major U.S.
ally, the Philippines.  It has threatened to renew attacks against U.S. citizens and it
may be growing in numbers. 
Other CRS Reports.
CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard
Cronin, Larry Niksch, and Bruce Vaughn, updated November 18, 2003.  
CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003. 
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al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
Name(s). al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, also spelled al- Jama’a al-Islamiyya,
(Islamic Group, IG). 
Goals and Objectives. The IG aims to overthrow the secular Egyptian
government and replace it with an Islamic state, governed by Shari’a law and devoid
of “un-Islamic” influences. 
Brief History.  Established in the late-1970s, the IG, an Islamic militant group,
was one of the largest and most active Islamic groups in Egypt.  Several key events
and phenomena served as catalysts for the group’s formation and the beginning of its
violent attacks.  The most notable event occurred in 1978 when Egypt, under
President Anwar Sadat’s leadership, became the first Arab country to sign a peace
accord with Israel (the Camp David Accords).  At about the same time, Sadat
introduced progressive social legislation, including measures to strengthen the rights
of women.  Sadat also began cracking down on and imprisoning members of militant
Islamic groups — a shift in policy from years of practicing a more tolerant approach
towards them.  These policies prompted the IG’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel
al- Rahman,103 to issue a fatwa calling for the assassination of Sadat, who was killed
in 1981.104  Although another Egyptian group, al- Jihad, was primarily responsible
for the assassination, several IG militants were involved and were convicted in
connection with the crime.105  
The IG is likewise suspected of a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak while traveling in Addis Ababa.106  In general, the
organization has targeted people and interests that they believe obstruct its vision of
an Islamic state, including government personnel, police officers, tourists, Coptic
Christians, secular intellectuals, and employees in banks, video stores, and theaters.
The Egyptian government blames the group for the deaths of over 1,300 people.107
In recent years, the IG is probably best known for the 1997 massacre of 58
foreign tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.108  Since the Luxor
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attack, the IG has split unofficially into two different ideological camps.109 The goal
of both groups remains the attainment of an Islamic state. However, one faction, led
by Rifa’i Taha Musa, condones the use of violence to achieve these ends, and the
other, led by Mustafa Hamza, condemns the use of violence.110 
The IG has not apparently engaged in a terrorist attack inside Egypt since
1998.111
Favored Tactics. The IG employs several different tactics, using car bombs,
suicide bombs, and gunfire.   
Anti-American Activities.  The IG has not directly targeted U.S. citizens or
interests, although the assassination of Sadat was considered a severe blow to U.S.
foreign policy interests in the region.  However, the group has previously threatened
violence against American interests and reportedly considered kidnapping Americans
to use as leverage to win the freedom of its leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”112
In 1998, the group’s current operational leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed Osama bin
Laden’s proclamation that calls for attacks against U.S. citizens.113
Primary Area(s) of Operation. The IG is based in southern (Upper) Egypt,
primarily in the regions of al- Minya, Assiut, Qina, and Sohaj.  The organization
reportedly has some support in Cairo and Alexandria, and also boasts a presence in
Afghanistan, Austria, Sudan, United Kingdom, and Yemen.114
Strength and Composition. The IG has an unknown number of followers,
but at its peak it consisted of several thousand militants.  Experts suspect that the
group has lost members since the 1990s, a phenomenon that may be attributable to
a 1999 cease-fire, as well as a government crackdown on militant groups since the
1997 attacks on tourists at Luxor and the September 11 attacks.115  The group has
tended to attract disenfranchised university graduates who may be frustrated by
widespread unemployment in the country.  
Connections with Other Groups. The IG allegedly maintains close contact
with the Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al- Jihad.  The two groups share members
and reportedly jointly planned and carried out the assassination of Sadat and the
attempted assassination of Mubarak.116  IG may also have a connection with Osama
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bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.  Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, a leader within the
IG and al-Jihad movement, is a close associate of bin Laden (see al-Jihad below).
Considering the close connections between al-Jihad and the IG, Zawahiri provides
a key link between IG and Al Qaeda. 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  According to the
Egyptian government, the IG receives aid from Iran, bin Laden and Afghan militant
groups.117  The organization may also receive some funding from Islamic non-
governmental organizations.118
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group’s potential threat to the
Egyptian government and murky funding sources (see above) make it a serious
concern in the war on terrorism.  Its link to Al Qaeda make it a potential threat to the
United States. 
Other CRS Reports.
CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
updated August 28, 2003. 
CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by Ted Dagne, updated
January 17, 2002.
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HAMAS 
Name(s).  Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia; Islamic Resistance Movement;
HAMAS; Hamas.
Goals and Objectives.  Hamas is a radical Islamic Palestinian organization
that initially sought to expel Jews and the state of Israel  from Israel/Palestine, and
to establish an  Islamic Palestinian state based on Islamic law.  These goals appear
to have been moderated somewhat in recent years, however, with indications that the
group would likely accept a favorable Israeli-Palestinian agreement. 
Brief History.  Hamas split off from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
organization in 1987, taking a much more militant line than its parent organization
in terms of both Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel/Palestine.
The group maintains both a social services wing that reportedly runs “clinics,
kindergartens, orphanages, colleges, summer camps and even sports clubs,”119 and
a terrorist wing that carries out attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.
Its social services wing has been very popular and important among Palestinians.
Hamas has carried out scores of bombings and has been among the most vigorous
participants in the first (1987-1990)and second (2000-present) Intifadas (or
Palestinian uprisings against Israel).  The group has opposed the Middle East peace
process and has positioned itself as a challenger to the Palestinian Authority in the
Gaza Strip, which it criticizes for making concessions to Israel and for corrupt and
ineffective government.120
 
Recently, Ariel Sharon’s government has become much more aggressive in
targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, including Hamas founder Sheikh Salah
Shehada (killed July 2002), bomb-maker Muhammed Deif (killed Sept. 2002), Abdel
Aziz Rantisi (June 2002) and most notably spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin
(Sept. 2002).121 Yassin and Rantisi are still alive.
Favored Tactics.  Since 1994, the primary terrorist tactic of Hamas has been
suicide bombings.122  Hamas bombers have not generally fit the expected profile,
sometimes including older men and people with relatively well-paying jobs and
families.  The group has also employed car bombings, mortar attacks, and
assassinations.123
Anti-American Activities.  According to the State Department, the group has
not targeted U.S. interests.  Several U.S. citizens have died as a result of Hamas
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bombings in Israel, although Americans do not appear to have been intentional
targets.124  Most notably, five American citizens were among 65 killed in a series of
four joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, see entry below) bombings in 1996.
Areas of Operation.  Hamas operates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but
is strongest in the latter.   The group also has presences in Syria, Lebanon, and the
Gulf States.125
Strength and Composition. The members of Hamas are Palestinian Islamic
radicals.  The number of official members is unknown.  According to some estimates,
the group has “tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers” for its
uncompromising anti-Israel position and its attacks against Israel, its opposition to
corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and its network of social services.126
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  Hamas’ closest ally
is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ-See below).  Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not
maintain ties; in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.127  Since 1994, the two
groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint
attacks and planned simultaneous bombings.  In 2000, Time Magazine reported that
Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinate their efforts and derail
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  Time also reported that Hizballah, a group
deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.128  There
have also been numerous reports that Hamas members received training and
logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.129  In June 2003, PIJ
and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on
Israelis and Israeli interests. 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Hamas reportedly
receives some aid from Iran (10% of its budget by some estimates) but apparently
derives most of its financing from Palestinian expatriates around the world, private
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sympathizers in Arab states, and legitimate businesses in Palestinian controlled
areas.130 
The Bush Administration accuses Syria and Iran of harboring and supporting
Hamas.131  Both states are opposed to Israel and the peace process, and both claim
that Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to Israel are legitimate freedom
fighters.132  During the Second Intifada, which began in late 2000, Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein reportedly gave money to the families of Palestinian suicide
bombers, including Hamas members.  Furthermore, Israel has accused Saudi Arabia
of allowing money raised in state-run telethons to go to support Hamas.133  Secretary
of State Colin Powell implied sympathy for that allegation by stating, “There are
some troubling aspects as to how that telethon money would be distributed.”134
Hamas reportedly also runs money-generating businesses in the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, and abroad.135  
Finally, Hamas is known to acquire money from charities operating in the West,
reportedly including: The Palestinian Relief Development Fund (U.K.); the Holy
Land Foundation (U.S.-assets currently frozen); Al Aqsa Foundation (Germany with
branches in Holland and Belgium); and Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la
Palestine (France).136
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group apparently has significant
financial resources and extensive international ties.  The combination of strong social
services and brutal terrorist attacks makes Hamas highly influential and dangerous.
Hamas is crucial to the future prospects of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Recent U.S. efforts at curtailing terrorist financing have targeted charitable
foundations that help support the activities of Hamas.  The role of Saudi Arabian
citizens in supporting Hamas, directly or indirectly, has been subject to much scrutiny
and criticism in the United States.
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Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM)
Name(s).  Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy
Warriors; formerly Harakat -ul-Ansar.
Goals and Objectives.  HUM is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant
organization that seeks to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and create
an Islamic state encompassing Pakistan and these territories.  
Brief History. Founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HUM was initially
founded to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s.  After
the Soviet pullout, HUM turned its focus on Kashmir, where it has carried out attacks
against Indian interests in the Indian-controlled territory of Jammu and Kashmir.  In
1998, Khalil signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on Americans and
other Western targets.  In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner which
resulted in the release of  Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India
since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.137  
After his release, Ahzar broke with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-e-
Muhammad, taking many HUM members with him (Jaish-e-Muhammad, see below).
In recent years, HUM activities have decreased significantly, and crackdowns on
Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group under-funded and under-
supported.138   In February 2000, longtime leader Khalil handed control of the group
over to Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, and in 2001, after the HUM was banned by
President Pervez Musharraf, Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.139
Favored Tactics.  HUM has attacked Indian military, government, and
civilian targets in Kashmir with bombs and various other means. The group has also
highjacked airliners. 
Anti-American Activities.  Despite signing Osama bin Laden’s 1998
declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S.
interests primarily.  HUM remains focused on Kashmir and Jammu.  However, in
2002, Pakistani authorities arrested  three members of an HUM subgroup, the al-
Almi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi that killed 11 people.140
Areas of Operation.  HUM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir, and conducts insurgent and terrorist operations in Indian-controlled Jammu
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and Kashmir.  In the past, the group has operated training camps in Afghanistan.141
Members of HUM have reportedly participated alongside other Islamic militants in
operations in Central Asia, Bosnia, and Burma.
Strength and Composition.  HUM is comprised of Islamic radicals from
Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as some Arab veterans of the Afghan war against the
Soviet Union.  The group is believed to have several thousand armed supporters.  The
group lost much of its strength in 2000 in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JEM, see below), and its activities have decreased since.142
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The leader of HUM
signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against American soldiers
and civilians.  The group is believed to have maintained ties with bin Laden and Al
Qaeda, but the nature of these ties is unclear.143  HUM has also cooperated with other
Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  HUM receives financial
support from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states.144  The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani
and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.145  Its fund-raising in Pakistan
has been largely curtailed since the government crackdown on extremists following
9/11.  The government of India has long accused Pakistan of supporting and
encouraging militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir, to include HUM.
Originally Designated. as an FTO  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  An important concern for the United
States in its war on terrorism is the apparent cooperation between HUM and Al
Qaeda.  The convergence of  a local, territorially-based agenda aimed at Jammu and
Kashmir with a global, anti-American, “international jihad” focus is worrisome.
Having its major locus of operations in Pakistan, a nuclear state that is allied with the
United States but potentially unstable, is also a serious concern.  Finally, attacks by
the HUM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states
apparently often on the brink of war.
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Hizballah 
Name(s).  Hezbollah, Party of God, Islamic Jihad, The Revolutionary Justice
Organization, The Islamic Resistance, Organization for the Oppressed on Earth.
Goals and Objectives.  According to its manifestos, Hizballah is dedicated
to the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and the ultimate establishment
of  an Islamic state in Lebanon.146 
Brief History.  Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and
ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution, Hizballah was formed in response
to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.  The group was the principal supporter of anti-
Western and anti-American terrorism in the 1980’s and is directed by its Majlis al-
Shura, or Consultative Council.  Since 1992, Hizballah has participated in Lebanon’s
political system and currently holds 12 seats, with its allies, in parliament.147  Other
terrorist activities include the highjacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), the detention
of 18 American hostages in Lebanon throughout  the 1980’s and 1990’s, the bombing
of Israel’s Embassy in Argentina (March 1992), and the bombing of the Argentine-
Jewish Mutual Association in Bueno Aires (July 1994).148  During its 15-year military
insurgency campaign against Israeli and Israeli-aligned forces in Southern Lebanon,
Hizballah carried out rocket attacks that killed Israeli civilians.149
Favored Tactics.  Hizballah has engaged in kidnappings, bombings, and
highjackings, as well as rocket strikes against Israeli settlements and the firing of
surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets.150
Anti-American Activities.  Hizballah’s most active period of anti-American
targeting occurred during the 1980’s and resulted in a very large number of U.S.
casualties.  Under the alias Islamic Jihad,151 Hizballah  has been implicated in or is
known to have carried out the truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (April
1983), the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18
Navy, and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (September
1984).152  Hizballah also claimed responsibility for an April 1984 bombing that killed
18 U.S. service members in Torrejon, Spain.  Of their strictly terrorist acts between
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1994 and 2002, however, none has been directly targeted at U.S. citizens or assets.
However, some experts believe there may be a resurgence in anti-American activity.
For example, Singapore’s Internal Security Department claims to have foiled a
Hizballah plot to attack U.S. shipping interests in the 1990’s.153 Moreover, Hizballah
has pledged retaliation for the death of Ali Hussein Saleh, a Hizballah security
official, for which the group blames both the United States and Israel.154  Finally,
some experts have warned of Hizballah’s potential for “wreaking havoc” in post-war
Iraq, although there is no direct evidence of a Hizballah role there so far.155
Primary Areas of Operation.  Hizballah operates in the southern suburbs
of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon.  It has established cells in Europe,
Africa, South America, North American, and Asia.156
Strength and Composition.  The group is believed to have two to five
thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.157 
Connections with Other Groups.  Saudi and Bahraini investigations claim
that Hizballah maintains connections with other Shiite groups bent on anti-regime
activity throughout the Gulf region.  Furthermore, portions of the U.S. government’s
indictment against bin Laden for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in
1998 state that “Al Qaeda also forged alliances with... Hezbollah (variant spelling),
for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the
West, particularly the United States.”158
State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding.  Iran supports Hizballah
with financial, political, and organizational aid, while Syria provides diplomatic,
political, and logistic support.159 In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
testified that Iran provides “up to $100 million a year in the case of Hezbollah
[sic].”160 
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The group also seeks financial aid from overseas, as evidenced by the U.S. arrest
in 2002 of Chawki and Muhamod Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette
smuggling operation to generate funds for Hizballah.161
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  The U.S. approach to Hizballah is
complex.  Hizballah has adopted a political role within Lebanon and is represented
in the Lebanese Parliament, with 12 seats (with its allies) out of 128.  Apparently
mainly because it forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hizballah is popular in
the Arab world.  Hizballah is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has
global assets.  The Lebanese government has refused to freeze the financial assets of
Hizballah.  Hizballah has killed a large number of Americans, especially during the
1980s, and has apparently cooperated with Al Qaeda on training and logistics;162
however, it has apparently not carried out attacks directly against Americans in recent
years.  Some experts claim that the group is a growing threat to the United States,
potentially comparable to Al Qaeda; others dispute this assessment and argue that
failing to distinguish between the groups will increase their incentives to cooperate,
ultimately increasing the threat to the United States.163    
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Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Name(s).  Islamic Party of Turkestan.
Goals and Objectives. The IMU is a radical Islamic organization seeking to
overthrow secular rule in Uzbekistan.  The group reportedly also seeks Islamic rule
in other Central Asian countries and to fight against those it deems enemies of
Islam.164 
Brief History. The IMU was formed in Afghanistan by radical Islamic
opponents of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is accused of brutally repressing
opposition to his rule and suppressing Islam.  However the roots of the IMU go back
as far as December 1991, when the mayor of  the eastern city of Namangan refused
to grant a group of young Muslims land on which to build a Mosque, and the men
seized the Communist Party headquarters.  The men were led by Tohir
Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (alias Juma
Namangani).  Yuldeshev was a 24-year-old college drop-out and mullah in the
Islamic underground movement. Khojaev was a former Soviet paratrooper who
apparently had his Muslim faith revitalized while fighting against the mujahidin
while he served in Afghanistan.165 
Under intense government pressure, Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan, was given
refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and began networking with Islamic groups.
Namangani made a name for himself as a bold fighter in the Tajik civil war.166  In
1996, the two men announced the formation of the IMU, and  reportedly helped the
Taliban against the Northern Alliance, even leading troops in battle.  From bases in
Tajikistan, the group launched a terror campaign against the Uzbek government.  
Because of tight security, the group has generally been unable to operate in
Uzbekistan and has been more active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  Many of the
group’s leaders, including Namangani, were killed or captured during the U.S.-led
war against the Taliban in 2001.167  
 
Favored Tactics.  The IMU has primarily used bombings and armed guerilla
warfare.
Anti-American Activities.  In August 2000, the IMU kidnapped four
American mountain climbers, who escaped after pushing their IMU guard off a
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cliff.168  The IMU also fought alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led war
in Afghanistan in late 2001. 
Areas of Operation.  The IMU operates throughout Central and South Asia,
especially in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders
converge.169  The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.170
Strength and Composition.  The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of
Global Terrorism, 2002, estimates that the IMU probably now has fewer than 1,000
militants.171  Before the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, which badly hurt the group,
the IMU was believed to have had closer to 2,000 members.172
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  IMU leaders are
believed to have formed ties to Al Qaeda while both were based in Afghanistan in
the late 1990s.173  IMU members are believed to have trained at Al Qaeda camps in
Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  The IMU received
support from other Islamic extremist groups as well as from sympathizers in the
Middle East and South Asia.  Before the post-9/11 crackdown, Al Qaeda is believed
to have been a major supporter of the IMU.174  The group is reportedly heavily
involved in the Central Asian opium trade; by one account, the group handles 70
percent of opium trafficking in the region.175
Originally Designated as an FTO.  September 25, 2000.
Re-designated.  September 25, 2002.
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group could play a role in impeding
the success of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the future stability of a post-
Taliban state.  Although the IMU was seriously damaged during military hostilities
against the Taliban regime, its role in the drug trade is of growing concern, as are its
very close ties to Al Qaeda.  
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Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Name(s).  Army of Mohammed; Khaddam ul-Islam.176
Goals and Objectives. The JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J&K with
Pakistan. 
Brief History. The JEM is a Pakistan-based, militant Islamic group founded
by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000.  Indian authorities arrested Azhar in
February 1994 in connection with terrorist activities perpetrated by Harakat-ul-
Mujahideen (HUM).177  Azhar was released from prison in December 1999 in
exchange for 155 hostages aboard an Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM
militants.178  Azhar established JEM shortly after his release from prison in India with
the express purpose of attacking Indian targets and liberating J&K from Indian rule.
The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings, and soldiers as
well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and in J&K.179  The JEM is suspected of
executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly building on October
1, 2001, killing up to 38 people.180  The group initially claimed credit for the attack,
but later denied involvement.  The Indian government has also accused the JEM, in
conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba,  of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian
Parliament on December 13, 2001.181  Armed with explosive materials and firearms,
five assailants stormed the Parliament and “fired indiscriminately,” killing nine
security guards and one civilian bystander.182  In January 2002, the government of
Pakistan banned JEM and several other groups (see also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba entry,
below). 
The JEM is viewed by some as the “deadliest” and  “principal terrorist
organization in Jammu and Kashmir.”183  As of September 2003, crackdowns on the
JEM have resulted in the deaths of 555 militants so far this year, including Gazi
Baba, operations chief of the group (Aug 30, 2001), and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan,
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second in command (Sept. 17, 2003).184  After President Musharraf outlawed the
group in January 2002, JEM changed its name to Khaddam-ul Islam.  At the same
time, JEM’s leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he
was released in December 2002.185  
Favored Tactics. Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen
(suicide terrorist) in nature.186  In this type of operation, a terrorist launches an attack
with the intention to kill as many people as possible and the expectation of being
killed at the scene of the attack in retaliation.187  In this fashion, JEM militants
allegedly stormed the Indian Parliament building, proceeded to engage the security
personnel in a firefight, and killed 10 people.  All five terrorists in this attack were
killed.  The JEM use a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns,
and assault rifles.  JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive
devices, and rocket grenades.188
Anti-American Activities.  The JEM was implicated in the February 2002
kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi.  Pearl, 38, worked
as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal.  He was on assignment
in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with
alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.189 (See also Lashkar I Jhangvi entry, below.)
Primary Area(s) of Operation.  The JEM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-
controlled Kashmir.  Most of its supporters are in Azad, Kashmir, Pakistan and
India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions.  The JEM primarily launches attacks in
Indian-controlled J&K.  The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 is the
only recorded instance in which the JEM attacked a target outside of the J&K. 
Strength and Composition.  The JEM consists of several hundred armed
supporters.190  Most of its members are Kashmiris and Pakistanis.  By some accounts,
up to 75% of JEM are former HUM members.191  The JEM is said to have supporters
and sympathizers in Afghanistan, including former Taliban associates and Arab
CRS-42
192  “Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security,
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/jem.htm],  accessed July 31, 2003.
193 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.
194 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110; “Jaish-e-
Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),
[h t t p : / /www.sa tp .o rg / sa tpo rgtp / coun t r i e s / i nd i a / s t a t e s / j andk/ t e r ro r i s t _
outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003. 
195  “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com].
196 Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, “New Delhi Lays Blame,” The Washington
Post, December 29, 2001.
veterans of the Afghan war.  Until the fall of 2001, the JEM reportedly “maintained
training camps in Afghanistan.”192
Connections with Other Groups. The JEM is reportedly linked with the
former Taliban regime and is believed to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and
the Al Qaeda network.193  The connection with the Taliban was apparently
established and maintained through madrassahs (religious schools) in Karachi and
Afghanistan.  JEM leader Azhar has reportedly met with leaders and key figures in
both the former Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Analysts believe that JEM maintains ties
with other Sunni Muslim groups in Pakistan, including Harakat ul-Mujahideen
(HUM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar I Jhangvi (LIJ), and Sipahi-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP).194 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Experts believe that
JEM has received some monetary support from bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as
HUM and Harakat ul-Jihad al- Islami (HUJI).195  Indian officials claim that the JEM
has also received support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in an attempt
to undermine Indian security forces and bolster Pakistan’s position in the dispute
over Kashmir.  Those claims remain in dispute.196  
Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group is potentially a serious threat
to stability in South Asia.  Its ties to Al Qaeda and the former Taliban regime make
it a significant concern for the United States.  Its murder of Daniel Pearl and targeting
of U.S. facilities may indicate that JEM will continue to target other American
citizens and interests in the future.  Attacks by JEM exacerbate the tensions between
India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war.    
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Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Goals and Objectives.  Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic group that aims
to create a strict Islamic state in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern
Philippine islands, and southern Thailand. 
Brief History.  The group’s roots trace back to Darul Islam, a violent Islamic
group that opposed Dutch rule in Indonesia in the 1940s.  After the Dutch left, the
movement opposed the new independent government of Sukarno for being too
secular.  The name Jemaah Islamiya (JI) emerged in the 1970s, during the Suharto
era, but it is unclear whether the name referred to an organized group or an informal
gathering of anti-government Islamic militants.197 The co-founders of JI, clerics Abu
Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school in Solo, on the
main island of Java.  Many suspected JI activists have been alumni of that school.198
 In 1985, the two co-founders fled to Malaysia, where they began to send Indonesians
and Malaysians to Afghanistan, initially to fight the Soviet occupation and then to
train in Al Qaeda camps.199  Apparently some time in the mid-1990s, Baasyir and
Sungkar merged their evolving network into Al Qaeda and began preparing for
attacks in Southeast Asia.  Bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand started in
2000.200  JI is linked to a wave of attacks in December 2000 against Christian
churches in Indonesia, for example, and aborted plots to bomb Western embassies
in Singapore.
The group is most infamous for the October 12, 2002 suicide bombing of a night
club on the Indonesian island of Bali that killed 200 people, many of them young
Australian tourists.  Abu Bakar Bashir, arrested one week after the Bali bombing, is
believed to be the group’s spiritual leader, though he denies it.  An Indonesian court
convicted Bashir of plotting to overthrow the government, but dropped more serious
charges.  His four-year jail sentence was later reduced to three years by an appellate
court.  Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, is reportedly JI’s chief of
operations and was arrested in mid-August 2003 in connection with the Bali
bombing. The CIA has dubbed Hambali “Asia’s bin Laden.”201 
 Other specific evidence of JI’s shared origins with Al Qaeda has come out in
the aftermath of the Bali tragedy.  During the trial of Bali bomber Ali Gufron (also
known as Mukhlas), the defendant claimed that he had fought alongside Osama bin
Laden in Afghanistan in the Battle of the Lion’s Den (Battle of Jaji), which occurred
in 1987 during the war against the Soviet Union. It is known that Osama bin Laden’s
recruitment center (Maktab al-Khidmat - see below) provided logistical support for
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non-Afghan mujahedin, including Indonesians, during that period; and Mukhlas has
testified that he met bin Laden while the Saudi was leading troops at Jaji.202  Building
on Mukhlas’ testimony, further specific research has shown that the senior leadership
of JI, including Hambali, camped, trained, and got their education in the Afghan war
against the Soviets.203
 Authorities in the region state that JI has continued to plot attacks against
Western targets in Southeast Asia.204  On August 5, 2003, JI militants are suspected
of having bombed a J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta killing 14 and wounding 148.205
Favored Tactics. Most of Jemaah Islamiya’s attacks have involved bombings
of varying degrees of sophistication. 
Anti-American Activities. In December 2001, JI was linked to plans to bomb
the U.S. embassy and other locations frequented by American businesspeople and
military personnel in Singapore.  In mid-2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative
revealed a joint Al Qaeda/Jemaah Islamiya plot to attack U.S. interests in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia
with car bombs on the anniversary of 9/11.206  On Aug. 5, 2003, Jemaah Islamiya was
linked to a car bombing at a J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 14 and injured
148.207
Areas of Operation. JI operates throughout Southeast Asia, although
Indonesia has traditionally been its primary area of operation.  The group has also
operated in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and possibly the Philippines.  It may also
have a presence in neighboring Southeast Asian countries and in Australia.
Strength and Composition. The numerical strength of JI is unknown. Some
believe that the majority of JI leaders were either part of a close group which traces
their relationship back to fighting the Soviets together in Afghanistan,208 or former
trainees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who got to know each other in the
CRS-46
209 Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on
Philippine Island,” The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2003. 
210 John McBeth, “Indonesia-Easy Does It,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17,
2003.
211 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.
212 “Jemaah Islamiyyah: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Asia
Report No. 63, Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 26, 2003.
213 “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Jemaah Islamiyah,” The Council on Foreign
Relations and the Markle Foundation,
[http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003.
214  Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.
215 “Singapore Government Reveals Extent of Islamic Terrorist Threat to South East Asia,”
Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Center, January 1, 2003. See also “Jemaah Islamiah Report
Released,” Radio Australia, available at
[http://abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s760988.htm].
216 “Worldwide arrests to root out alQaeda since September 11, 2001” Agence France
Presse, Sept. 14, 2002.
217 “Moro Rebels Topple Down Electric Posts,” Financial Times Information Global News
Wire, May 16, 2003. See also Anthony Davis, “Blast Suggests MILF-JI Links,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, May, 1, 2003.
terrorist camps in southern Philippines.209 Some intelligence reports say that up to
700 Indonesians trained in the camps from 1997 to 98.210 The State Department’s
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates that the group probably has several
hundred operatives, but also cites Singaporean officials who put the group’s strength
around 5,000.211  It is unclear how crackdowns on the group in various countries
since 9/11, and especially since the Bali nightclub bombing, have affected the group.
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  JI is alleged to have
extensive ties to Al Qaeda, but the precise nature of those ties is in dispute.  Some
contend that the group is essentially subordinate to Al Qaeda, while others argue that
Al Qaeda acts more like a funding agency that approves grants for independent JI
proposals.212  Captured Al Qaeda operatives have reportedly asserted that JI leaders
have been involved in various Al Qaeda plots.213  Two of the 9/11 hijackers and
imprisoned accused operative Zacarias Moussaui allegedly visited Malaysia and met
with JI members in 2000, and JI members reportedly sent money to them.214
Furthermore, in January of 2003, Singapore’s Internal Security Department released
a report based on interviews with detained JI militants that outlines the close
operational links between JI and Al Qaeda.215  
 
Furthermore, the 13 suspects arrested in Singapore for the foiled plot against
U.S. shipping interests in December 2001 are also believed to be connected to Al
Qaeda.216 JI is also believed to have operational links to the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) in the Philippines and the Malaysian Kampulan Mujihhedin Malaysia
(KMM).217
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State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  According to the U.S.
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, JI receives funding and
logistical help from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and Al Qaeda.  The group also raises funds from
sympathizers in the Southeast Asian region.
Originally Designated as an FTO. October 23, 2002.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  Although there have been important
arrests of JI members, some terrorism experts worry that Jemaah Islamiya is still a
serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia.  Members of the
group continue to plot against Americans and American interests, as well as the
citizens and assets of U.S. allies.  Jemaah Islamiya’s apparently extensive ties to Al
Qaeda make it a particular concern for the United States.  Indonesia’s reluctance to
crack down on JI for domestic political reasons could complicate U.S. policy if
another anti-Western attack occurs.  Additionally, the growing evidence of ties
between JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a radical Islamic separatist
group in the Philippines),218 may soon force the United States and the Philippines to
decide whether they must confront the MILF militarily. 
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Al-Jihad
Name(s).  Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of
Conquest. 
Goals and Objectives.  Al-Jihad is committed to the violent overthrow of
the Egyptian government, to the establishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt, and to
attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt. 
Brief History.  Founded in the late 1970s, al-Jihad is a violent offshoot of the
Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in 1928 by
Hasan al Banna seeking a return to the original precepts of the Qu’ran and opposed
to the secular rule and Western influence.  Known for high profile assassinations and
bombings, al-Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat (Oct. 1981), the death of the People’s Assembly  Speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub
(Oct. 1990), and attempts on the lives of Interior Minister Al-Alfi (Aug. 1993), Prime
Minister Atef Sedky (Nov. 1993), and President Hosni Mubarak (1995).219  
In the early 1980s, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruthlessly cracked down
on al-Jihad, forcing a split in the group.220  One faction, led by the imprisoned Abbud
al-Zumar, has called for peaceful negotiation; but his faction has apparently withered.
The other faction, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, became even more violent, and around
1987 moved al-Jihad’s base of operations to Afghanistan.221  Al-Zawahiri has moved
further away from the Egyptian cause and has embraced Osama bin Laden’s Al
Qaeda quest to target American interests directly.  In 1998 al-Jihad joined, and al-
Zawahiri reportedly leads, Al Qaeda’s so-called International Front for Jihad against
Jews and Crusaders.  Then, in 2001, al-Jihad apparently merged with Al Qaeda.
There have been no attacks inside Egypt attributed to al-Jihad since 1998.222
Favorite Tactics.  Al-Jihad has engaged in assassinations, bombings, and
suicide attacks.223
Anti-American Activity.  Since the mid-1990s, al-Jihad has been shifting its
focus from Egyptian to American targets.  Commandos for al-Jihad were linked to
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a foiled attack on the U.S. Embassy in Albania in August 1998.224  As part of Al
Qaeda, al-Jihad members are believed to have been involved in the bombings of the
American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on Aug. 7,
1998.225  They are also implicated in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in port at
Aden, Yemen,226 and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon.227
Primary Area(s) of Operation.  Historically, al-Jihad operated in the Cairo
area; but most of its network is now outside Egypt, in places such as Yemen,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.228  After the external
component of al-Jihad merged with Al Qaeda, the group’s areas of operation may
have expanded.
Strength and Composition.  Unknown.  It is likely that al-Jihad has several
hundred hard-core militants and possible several thousand supporters.  After merging
with Al Qaeda, distinguishing between members of the groups became more difficult.
Connections with Other Groups.  In June 2001 al-Jihad allegedly merged
with Al Qaeda after a decade of increasing cooperation. 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Uncertain.  Egypt has
claimed that al-Jihad is supported by Iran and Sudan, accusations that those states’
governments have denied.229  In 2002 U.S. intelligence claimed that Iran was
harboring Saif al-Adl, Osama bin Laden’s security chief and an Egyptian national
with links to al-Jihad.230 However, Iran claims to have prosecuted or deported all Al
Qaeda related persons within its borders as of October 2003.231 In view of al-Jihad’s
apparent merger with Al Qaeda, the groups are likely cooperating on sources of
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revenue.  Other sources of revenue may include non-governmental Islamic agencies
and criminal acts.232
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group has engaged in violent
attacks against the United States and its interests.  It is closely associated with Al
Qaeda and, with that organization, has apparently evolved from a territorially-based
threat to a truly global network.  
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Kahane Chai (Kach)
Goals and Objectives. Kach and Kahane Chai are radical Jewish groups that
aim to restore the Biblical state of Israel by annexing the West Bank and Gaza as well
as parts of Jordan, and expelling all Arabs from this territory.  These groups also seek
the strict implementation of Jewish law.233
Brief History.  Kach was founded in 1971 by Meir Kahane, an Israeli-
American Rabbi who was assassinated in New York in 1990 by El Sayyid Nosair, an
Islamic radical also connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.234  Kahane’s
son, Binyamin, then founded Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives), although Kach appears
to have continued to operate as an independent organization.  Binyamin and his wife
were killed in a 2000 drive-by shooting by a Palestinian group in a West Bank
settlement.235  
Beginning with the 2002 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State
Department has listed the two groups as one entry, suggesting that the two have
essentially merged.  In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a radical Jewish settler and U.S.
immigrant to Israel, attacked a mosque in Hebron with a machine gun, killing 29
worshippers and wounding about 150.  Goldstein was reportedly associated with
Kach and other Jewish militant groups.  Both Kach and Kahane Chai publicly
supported the attack, leading Israel to declare them both terrorist organizations.236 
The groups have conducted numerous attacks against Palestinians in the West
Bank and Jerusalem with rocks, grenades, and firearms, including a failed attempt to
assassinate several Palestinian mayors.237  Since the beginning of the second Intifada
in September, 2000, at least seven Palestinians have been shot in the West Bank by
Jewish settlers believed by Israeli police to be associated with Kahane Chai.238  In
2002, they were suspected of involvement in several attacks against Palestinians, but
neither group claimed responsibility.
 
Favored Tactics. Kach and Kahane Chai have attacked Palestinian targets
with guns, grenades, bombs, and other weapons. 
Anti-American Activities.   Neither Kach or Kahane Chai is known to have
attacked U.S. interests.   However, in December 2001 several members of the Jewish
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Defense League, a group associated with Kahane, were arrested by the FBI  in
California and charged with plotting to bomb the offices of Representative Darrell
Issa, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles.239
Areas of Operation. Both groups operate primarily in Israel and the West
Bank, but recent arrests have led to concern that they could be planning attacks in the
United States.
Strength and Composition.  The groups’ strength is unknown, according
to the State Department.240  Estimates by other organizations place the groups’
strength at around several dozen.241
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Neither Kach nor
Kahane Chai is known to have ties to other designated foreign terrorist organizations.
Both are believed to be linked to various militant Jewish groups in Israel and the
West Bank.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Kach and Kahane
Chai receive support from sympathizers in Europe and the United States.  Within
Israel, the groups receive funding and other support from various sympathizers,
particularly members of settler communities in the West Bank.
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group has allegedly plotted a
violent attack against a Member of Congress, as well as a mosque and a Muslim
advocacy group in Los Angeles.  Its alleged activities lead to concern about the
potential for future violence against civilians and property within the United States
Other CRS Reports.
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.  
CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United
States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.
CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz,
updated October 22, 2003.
CRS-53
242  CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by
Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003, p. 27.
243 “U.S. Welcomes Ocalan Capture,” Agence France Presse Feb. 16, 1999.
244 Louis Meixler, “Kurdish Rebel Group Dissolves Itself,” Associated Press, Nov. 11, 2003.
See also, “Turkish Kurd Rebel Group Disbands,” Dow Jones, Nov. 11, 2003.
245 Periscope, USNI Database. “Terrorism Database.” [http://scope1.com] 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Name(s).  Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and
Democracy Congress of Kurdistan, KADEK, KONGRA-GEL. 
Goals and Objectives.  The PKK is a secular, leftist insurgent group that
originally aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically
Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq,
and Syria.  More recently, the group has claimed to be seeking greater political and
cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey rather than a separate homeland.242
Brief History.  The PKK was founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist group
seeking to establish a Marxist Kurdish state in Southeast Turkey.  The group
launched a guerilla war against the Turkish government beginning in 1984 that
claimed as many as 35,000 lives.  After a brutal crackdown by the Turkish military
in the early 1990s,  the group shifted from a rural insurgency strategy to urban
terrorism.  In 1999, Turkish authorities, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence,
captured the PKK’s charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan, striking a major blow
against the group.243  Ocalan’s arrest sparked riots among Kurdish populations in
parts of Europe.  
Under threat of a death sentence, Ocalan advised his followers to refrain from
violence and to pursue Kurdish rights peacefully.  The PKK has essentially ceased
its attacks as a result, and in 2000, the group formally announced its intention to use
only political means to achieve the goal of rights for Turkish Kurds.  The armed wing
of the PKK (called the People’s Defense Forces) did not, however, disarm.  The PKK
first renamed itself the KADEK and then the KONGRA-GEL.  In November 2003,
the KADEK announced plans to dissolve itself and, according to reports, establish
a “new group that would likely be pan-Kurdish and would pursue Kurdish rights
through negotiations.”244  On November 14, 2003, the U.S. State Department stated,
“The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change
or press release can alter that fact.”
 
Favored Tactics.  Many PKK attacks targeted Turkish military and security
forces.  In addition, however, the PKK used suicide bombings, car bombings,
kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks against Turkish diplomats in Europe.245
There were also attacks on symbolic representatives of the Turkish state in the
Southeast, such as teachers.  
Anti-American Activities.  The PKK has not directly attacked or targeted
U.S. citizens or interests.
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Areas of Operation. The PKK has operated primarily in Turkey.  The armed
wing of the group apparently took refuge in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. In the past, the
group maintained bases in Syria and Lebanon.246
Strength and Composition. The PKK is comprised mainly of Turkish
Kurds and has approximately 4,000 to 5,000 fighters, according to the State
Department and other sources.247
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In the early 1980’s,
when the PKK fled to Lebanon’s Syria-controlled Beka’a Valley, the group
reportedly got its first real training alongside various Palestinian groups and with the
help of Syrian intelligence.248   Later, the PKK reportedly provided a safe haven for
the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F), another Turkish group,
in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region.  The two groups signed a protocol in
1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups249  However,
cooperation has apparently since broken down. (See RPLP/F entry below.)  
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. During its history,
PKK reportedly received support and safe haven from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Greece.250
The group also raises funds in Europe among Kurdish expatriates, some of whom
accuse the Turkish government of human rights violations in its campaign against the
PKK.251 
Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish
minority has been a significant issue in its efforts to join the European Union.  The
European Union only named the PKK a foreign terrorist organization in May 2002
and has not similarly identified KADEK.  With its leader Ocalan in jail, it is unclear
whether the PKK, in its evolving form, will continue to be a violent group.  The
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Kurdish population in northern Iraq may play a role: for example, actions by Iraqi
Kurds against PKK guerrillas remaining in Iraq could affect the future of
PKK/KADEK/KONDRA-GEL.    
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Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
Name(s).  Army of the Righteous/Pure, Jamaat al-Dawat.
Goals and Objectives.  Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a radical Islamic group
in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia.  Although
primarily focused on freeing Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic
state there, the group has also suggested that it aims to establish Islamic rule over all
of India as well.  
Brief History.  Formed in 1990, LT is the military wing of the Pakistani
radical Islamic organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI, or Center for
Islamic Call and Guidance), which itself formed in 1989.  Since 1993, LT has
become one of the largest and best organized groups fighting in Kashmir against
India.252  The group has conducted a number of attacks against Indian troops and
civilians in Kashmir.  
The Indian government accused the group of involvement in the December 2001
bombing of the Indian parliament and charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI)
with supporting the group.253  President Musharraf banned the LT and several other
groups (see Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above) in January 2002, and  the LT renamed
itself Jamaat al-Dawat.254  The LT’s leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was  arrested
in Pakistan in January 2002 but then released in December 2002.255  
In May and June 2003,  the FBI arrested 11 men in Virginia on charges of
training with and supporting Lashkar e Tayyiba.  The 11 are to face trial in the U.S.
District Court in Alexandria, Virginia.256 In July, a federal judge ordered four of the
eleven suspects released from custody until their trial begins.257
 
Favored Tactics. In its attacks, LT has used various types of firearms,
machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.
Anti-American Activities.  Lashkar e Tayyiba is not known to have
conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests.  The group
remains focused on Kashmir.
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There is, however, possible cooperation between LT and Al Qaeda (see below).
Areas of Operation.  LT is based near Lahore in Pakistan and, according to
the State Department, operates mobile training camps in Pakistan-controlled
Kashmir.258  The group also had training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of the
Taliban in late 2001.  LT is believed to have conducted operations not only in Indian-
controlled Kashmir, but also in other regions of India.  
Strength and Composition.  Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is comprised mainly of
Pakistani Islamic radicals, although some Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars are
also members.  The State Department estimates a total of several hundred
members.259
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  In March 2002,
senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in an LT safe house in
Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda members to
move through Pakistan.260  There are also reports that members of LT have
participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the
group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations.261
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the State
Department, LT collects donations from Pakistani expatriates in the Persian Gulf and
the United Kingdom.262  The group also reportedly receives support from Arab
sympathizers in the Persian Gulf states.263   Prior to a crackdown by the Pakistani
government against anti-Indian groups operating in Kashmir, the group invested in
various business enterprises in Pakistan.
Originally Designated as an FTO.  December 24, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  The LT’s activities directed against
India  pose a threat to the stability of South Asia.  The group may also be helping
members of Al Qaeda in their anti-American activities. Its apparent links to other
radical Islamic organizations lead to concern about the degree to which the LT is part
of an evolving globalized network of terrorist organizations.  Within the United
States, this group’s alleged training and fund-raising activities in Alexandria,
Virginia, if proven true, are also cause for concern (see above).  
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Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)
Name(s).  Army of Jhangvi.
Goals and Objectives. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is a radical Sunni group that
has primarily targeted Shi’a Muslims in Pakistan.  The group apparently aims to
establish Pakistan as a Sunni Islamic state based on Islamic law.  The group has close
links to Al Qaeda and has adopted that organization’s anti-Western, anti-U.S.
ideology.
Brief History.  LJ arose in 1996 out of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan between
radical Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim factions.  LJ’s members belong to the
radical Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam, and have carried out numerous attacks against
the minority Shi’a population, which they consider apostate.  LJ reportedly killed 25
Shi’a and wounded 50 others in Lahore in 1998 and attempted to assassinate then-
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.264  The group has also been connected to
attacks against Christian groups in Pakistan.265  In mid-2001, Pakistani President
Musharraf outlawed the group, which took refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.266
Since the fall of the Taliban, the group has presumably returned to Pakistan, but
several leaders have been captured or killed by the Pakistani government.267
 
Favored Tactics. The group has conducted a variety of armed attacks and
bombings, including several suicide bombings.  
Anti-American Activities.  Lashkar I Jhangvi has carried out several attacks
against Americans in Pakistan, most notably the kidnapping and subsequent murder
of journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 in conjunction with Al Qaeda. (See also Jaish-e-
Mohammed entry, above.)  The group also reportedly killed four American oil
workers in 1997268 and attacked the Protestant International Church in Islamabad with
grenades in 2002, killing two Americans.269 
Areas of Operation. The group operates mainly in Punjab and Karachi in
Pakistan, and some members reportedly travel in Afghanistan.  Its strength is most
manifest in urban areas.
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Strength and Composition.  The members of Lashkar I Jhangvi are militant
Sunni Muslims of the Deobandi sect.  The State Department estimates their strength
at fewer than 100.270
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  LJ’s leaders
participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and are believed
to have connected with bin Laden during that time.  LJ members reportedly trained
at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s.  Al Qaeda is also believed to have
provided key support to the group in several of its attacks against Western targets
since 2002.  Pakistani authorities believe that LJ has formed a partnership with two
other Islamic militant groups in Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and Jaish-
e-Mohammed (JeM, see entry above), to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO), also called al-
Qanoon.271 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Beyond support from
Al Qaeda, it is not known how the group funds its activities.
Originally Designated as an FTO.  January 30, 2003.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group has engaged in serious anti-
American violence in Pakistan, including apparently participating in the kidnapping
and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl.  (See also Jaish-e-Mohammed entry,
above.)  Its activities may threaten the stability of Pakistan and the South Asian
region.  Its connections with Al Qaeda make it a serious concern.   
Other CRS Reports.  
CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by Audrey Kurth Cronin,
August 28, 2003. 
CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,
by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003. 
CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt, updated
November 3, 2003.
CRS Report RL21658, International Terrorism in South Asia, by K. Alan Kronstadt,
updated November 3, 2003.
CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and
Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by Kaia Leather, updated September
30, 2002.
CRS-61
272  CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by Bruce Vaughn,
November 5, 2003, p. 4.
273 Kim Barker, “In War Torn Sri Lanka, Truce Holds Day by Day,” Chicago Tribune, April
4, 2002. See also Catherine Philip, “Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers Ready to End 19-Year War
and Share Power,” The Times, December 6, 2002. See also Amal Jayasinge and Edward
Luce, “Tamil Tigers Emerge from the Shadows,” Financial Times, April 5, 2002.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Name(s).  Tamil Tigers.
Goals and Objectives. The LTTE is a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka
that initially aimed to establish an independent state including the ethnically Tamil
regions of the island.  Recently the group has softened its insistence on an
independent Tamil state, declaring that it will accept a solution that respects the
principle of self-determination, possibly an autonomous area for Tamil-speaking
peoples within a federal structure (see below).   
Brief History. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were founded by the
charismatic Vellupillai Prabhakaran and arose in the 1970s as the strongest of a
number of Tamil groups opposing discrimination against Tamils by the dominant
Sinhalese ethnic group.  In 1983, in retaliation for the deaths of thirteen Sinhalese
soldiers, several thousand Tamils were killed in riots that marked the beginning of
full scale separatist war.  In the ensuing 20-year war, an estimated 64,000 people
were killed and between 800,000 and 1.6 million persons were displaced.  
The Tamil Tigers have gained control of portions of the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka and have a substantial arsenal including artillery, mortars, and
anti-aircraft weapons.  They also have a naval component with speedboats,
demolition teams, and fishing boats.272  The LTTE’s most infamous element is the
Black Tigers, the 500 plus member highly-trained unit that carries out the group’s
suicide attacks.  The LTTE has engaged in a large number of political terrorist attacks
and killings, most notably including the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa.  It is the only terrorist
group ever to have assassinated two heads of state. And in December 1999, three
days before re-election, current President Chandrika Kumaratunga lost vision in one
eye to a LTTE suicide attack that killed 26.
Citing fundamental changes in international attitudes towards violence for
political ends after the September 11 attacks, experts say support and funding for the
LTTE from the Tamil diaspora fell off dramatically. This was apparently a factor
bringing this group to the negotiating table.273  Since December 2001, the LTTE has
largely respected a cease fire negotiated with the Sri Lankan government.  In
September 2002, the LTTE and the Columbo government held their first peace talks
in seven years.  In December 2002 both sides made what could be the most important
breakthrough by issuing a statement saying, “The parties have agreed to explore a
solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in the areas of
historical habituation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure
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within a united Sri Lanka.”274  Such a statement marks significant concessions from
the LTTE who have always sought independence rather than autonomy, and from the
government in Colombo, which would be accepting the idea of federalism for the
first time.
On the 4th and 5th of November 2003, Sri Lankan President Chandrika
Kumaratunga removed three top cabinet officials, suspended parliament, and
deployed troops around the Sri Lankan Capital of Colombo. The political crisis
apparently was a result of a power struggle between President Kumaratunga, who
represents the more hardline faction within the government, and the more
conciliatory elements led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.  After reviving
the Norwegian brokered peace talks in late 2001 Wickremesinghe has made
significant gains, including a permanent cease-fire established and more-or-less
respected since February 2002 and several rounds of successful talks.  However,
fearing Kumaratunga could veto any agreement, Wickremesinghe proposed a
constitutional amendment (the 19th)  that would eliminate the President’s power to
dissolve the parliament.  Kumaratunga and her supporters are opposed to any
settlement that would establish a federal system and infringe on Sri Lankan
sovereignty.  They believe the Norwegian mediators are biased in favor of the
rebels.275  This crisis is as yet unresolved.
 
Favored Tactics. The LTTE’s tactics have ranged from full military
operations to terrorist attacks against civilian centers and political assassinations.
Inspired by the apparent success of  suicide bombings by Hizballah in the latter’s
campaign against foreign occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, the LTTE launched
its first suicide attack in 1987.276  The group subsequently conducted the bloodiest
suicide campaign on record, involving more than 150 attacks.277  The LTTE is also
noted for the first and most active use of female suicide bombers, who have carried
out 30-40% of the suicide attacks of the LTTE.278
Anti-American Activities.   The LTTE has not targeted or attacked U.S.
interests.
Areas of Operation.  The LTTE operates mainly in the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka, but has also operated throughout the island and in India.279
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Most notably, there was the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi on May 22, 1991 while he
was attending an election rally in Sriperambudur, India. 
Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that LTTE has
between 8,000 and 10,000 armed combatants plus substantial numbers of supporters
within Sri Lanka and overseas.280  The Black Tigers, which are the elite unit believed
responsible for most of the suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, reportedly
have some 500 members.281
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The Tamil Tigers are
not believed to have connections to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.  LTTE suicide
bombing tactics have been copied by various groups, however.  For instance, Soosai,
the head of the Sea Tigers, who carry out the LTTE’s naval attacks, claimed in a
November 2002 interview that Al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 had
been inspired by LTTE naval operations.282
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. LTTE has raised
funds among the Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia, and from
smuggling and businesses in Sri Lanka.283  The most common estimates state that
before 2001, the Tigers collected up to $1 million a month from expatriates in
Canada, Britain, Switzerland and Australia, making it among the most well-funded
terrorist groups in the world.284  This flow of funds was apparently significantly
reduced after the September 11th, 2001 attacks.  
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  Although it is still early to be certain,
this extremely violent, territorially-based group may be an example of a group that
has been moved by the war on terrorism (among other things) toward negotiation and
peaceful resolution.   The apparently dramatic fall-off in funding after September 11th
was an important development. The evolution of the LTTE and its relationship to the
Sri Lankan government bears close scrutiny in future months. For example, the
extremely authoritarian nature of Prabhakaran’s rule over the LTTE realm may pose
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Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
Name(s).  People’s Mujahedeen of Iran; PMOI; The National Liberation Army
of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), National Council of Resistance (NCR);
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Muslim Iranian Student’s
Society.285
Goals and Objectives.  The MEK is an Iranian dissident group whose
ideology originally blended Marxism with a moderate interpretation of Islam.  In the
1970s, the group opposed the regime of the Shah for its corruption and perceived
susceptibility to U.S. and Western influence.  Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979,
MEK has opposed the religious Iranian regime, favoring a secular government in
Iran.  The group apparently supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of
Iran’s minorities, although some believe the group takes these positions only to
improve its image in Western countries.286 
Brief History.  The MEK was founded in the 1960s by leftist college students
in Iran opposed to the Shah, who they believed was corrupt and too open to Western
influences.  During the 1970s, the group conducted several attacks against U.S.
military personnel and civilians working with the Shah, as well as attacks against the
Iranian government.  The MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah,
but quickly fell out of favor with Ayatollah Khomeini.  Some of its original
leadership was executed by the Khomeini regime.
In 1981, the MEK bombed several important government buildings, killing as
many as 70 high-ranking Iranian officials.  Under pressure from the government in
Tehran, the group fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which it took refuge in
Iraq.  While in Iraq, Saddam Hussein armed the group and sent it into battle against
Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.  The group also provided various security services for
the Saddam Hussein regime, including helping with the suppression of Kurdish and
Shi’a revolts after the first Gulf War in 1991.  It continued to attack the Iranian
regime, conducting a 1992 bombing campaigning of Iranian embassies in 13 different
countries.  In early 2000, the group used mortars to attack the leadership complex in
Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President.  Since the
end of the Iran-Iraq War, the group has represented an important security threat to the
Iranian regime.287  
U.S. and international policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and
controversial.  Some see the group as a legitimate, pro-democracy resistance to the
illiberal Iranian government, while others condemn the group’s earlier anti-Western
attacks and regard the group as an anti-Western cult with a pro-democracy facade.
French authorities arrested more than 160 members, including the group’s leader
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Maryam Rajavi, in Paris in 2003, reversing the longstanding French policy of giving
asylum to the group.288  Several high-profile figures have opposed the arrests.289
During the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. forces bombed MEK bases in Iraq but later signed a
cease-fire with the group.  Finally in May 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the
group.290
 
Favored Tactics.  The MEK’s tactics range from bombings to organized
guerilla warfare.  
Anti-American Activities.  The MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S.
interests since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.  During the 1970s, it conducted
several attacks against American military and civilian targets and participated in the
capture of the U.S. embassy during the revolution.291
Areas of Operation.  The MEK is primarily based in Iraq, near the border
with Iran, but it has a global presence.  The group conducted attacks in Iran and has
also attacked Iranian interests in Europe and elsewhere.  The group has affiliated
lobbying organizations in the United States and Europe, and prior to a French
crackdown in 2003, its members took refuge in France.
Strength and Composition.  The MEK is comprised of Iranian dissidents
opposed to the Islamic regime in Iran.  According to the State Department, the group
possesses several thousand fighters in Iraq and additional members operating
overseas.  Within Iraq, the group has until recently controlled aging military
equipment given to it by Saddam Hussein, including tanks, artillery, and armored
vehicles.292  The U.S. military in Iraq recently disarmed the group.
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  MEK has no known
connections with other terrorist groups.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Until the recent war
to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the MEK received all of its military assistance and
much of its financial support from the Iraqi regime.  The group apparently uses front
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organizations to solicit contributions from Iranian expatriates and others, and may
also raise funds among sympathizers within Iran .293 
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Legal Challenges to Designation. In 1998, a majority in the U.S. House
of Representatives signed a letter challenging the State Department’s designation of
MEK as an FTO.  Some Members have suggested that the United States should
support the group as an alternative to the Islamic regime in Iran.294  The debate over
designation of the group has resurfaced in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war.  Some
believe that the group represents legitimate opposition to the regime in Iran, while
others contend that the group is essentially a fanatical cult with a sophisticated public
relations wing and that its pro-Western, pro-democracy overtures should not be
trusted.295  The State Department continues to resist pressure to remove the MEK
from the FTO list.  On August 15, 2003, the State Department added the group’s
political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR)296 to the group’s
designation.297  Previously, the NCR had operated in the United States as a legitimate,
registered lobbying organization.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  In the recent past, this group has actively
lobbied on Capitol Hill.  Its political/lobbying arm is now also specifically cited by
name as an alias for the MEK (and thus a foreign terrorist organization), and its
assets have been frozen as a specially designated entity by the Treasury Department
under Executive Order 13224.298  (See also Legal Challenges to Designation, above.)
American treatment of this group in the aftermath of active hostilities in Iraq was at
first ambivalent, but the group is currently disarmed.  The status of this group is an
important issue in the relationship between the United States and Iran.  
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National Liberation Army (ELN)
Name(s).  National Liberation Army; ELN.
Goals and Objectives. The founders of ELN hoped to emulate Cuba’s
Marxist revolution in Colombia.  The group’s objectives are to overthrow the
government of Colombia and replace the capitalist economy with a socialist system.
The group claims to represent the oppressed poor in Colombia against the wealthy
classes, and it opposes privatization and U.S. influence in Colombia.299
Brief History. ELN was formed in 1964 by a group of students, Catholic
radicals, and leftist intellectuals inspired by Che Guevara and trained in Cuba.  For
many years, the group was led by priests who opposed drugs and drug trafficking on
moral grounds.  Experts contend that this influence accounts for a relatively low level
of drug-related activity within ELN, in comparison, for example, to FARC (see entry
below).300  ELN and FARC, despite similar Marxist ideologies, have become rivals.
  
Favored Tactics. ELN relies on kidnapping and extortion for funding,
reportedly taking more than 800 hostages for ransom in 2001.301  ELN has also
conducted bombing campaigns against multinational and domestic oil companies,
including attacking oil pipelines.302
Anti-American Activities.  The group opposes U.S. influence in Colombia
and has attacked U.S. interests, particularly energy companies.  In 1998, ELN
activists bombed and ransacked a Dole-owned subsidiary and attacked the Ocensa
pipeline, which is jointly owned by a consortium of American, British, French,
Canadian, and Colombian companies.303  The group has also kidnapped Americans
for ransom.
Areas of Operation. ELN is based in rural and mountainous areas of north,
northeast, and southwest Colombia and in border areas of Venezuela.  The group has
also reportedly used Bolivian territory.304
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Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates ELN strength
between 3,000 and 5,000 armed militants, plus an unknown number of active
supporters.305  It thus appears to be roughly one third the size of Colombia’s other
leftist militant group FARC (see entry below).
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There are no known
connections between ELN and other terrorist organizations.  
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Most of ELN’s
funding comes from kidnapping and extortion against wealthy Colombians,
government officials, and employees of multinational corporations, particularly oil
companies.  In addition, the group has now reportedly entered the illegal drug
trade.306  Until the early 1990s, ELN received support from Cuba.   However, in
recent years Castro has attempted to broker peace agreements between the ELN and
the Colombian government.  It is unclear whether the group continues to receive
support from Castro.307
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group poses a serious threat to U.S.
citizens and interests in Colombia and is apparently now involved in drug trafficking.
It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government.
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Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Name(s). Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Goals and Objectives. PIJ’s goal is to establish an Islamic Palestinian state
and topple the state of Israel.
Brief History. PIJ is a highly active Palestinian organization founded in 1979
by Palestinian students in Egypt.  PIJ’s founding members — Fathi Shiqaqi, Abd al-
Aziz Odah, and Bashir Musa — were once members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see
also al-Jihad entry), but split from the group because of what they perceived as a
moderate stance within the group and a diluted focus on the Palestinian issue.308  The
founding members were inspired by the Iranian revolution and espoused several of
its tenets. 
 
PIJ’s sole focus is to defeat the state of Israel (using “violence as a legitimate
means”) and establish an Islamic Palestinian state.  To this end, PIJ militants have
perpetrated suicide bomb attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets
throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories.  Since the start of the second Intifada
(September 2000), PIJ has conducted attacks that have killed more than 100
people.309  On June 29, 2003,  after 33 consecutive months of violence, the radical
group ceded to Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas’ appeal for a cease-fire.310
However, only about a week later, the group called off the cease-fire, complaining
that Israel failed to fulfill aspects of the agreement, including the release of several
jailed Islamic militants.  The cease-fire is “effectively over” and ‘attacks will
resume,’ said the Jenin leader of the PIJ Bessam Sa’adi.311  And the attacks did
resume: on July 8, 2003, PIJ claimed a suicide bomb attack in central Israel that
killed a 65-year old woman as well as the perpetrator.
Favored Tactics.  The PIJ engages in suicide attacks against Israeli targets.
Occasionally, the PIJ also uses gunfire in its operations. 
Anti-American Activities.  The PIJ does not directly target U.S. interests;
however, Americans have died in PIJ attacks.  For example, in November 2001,
Shoshani Ben-Yishai, a 16-year old New York-born American student in Jerusalem
died after a militant sprayed gunfire on the city bus she and her classmates were
riding.  Alisa Flatow, 20, was similarly killed in a bus attack in Apr. 1995.312  In
February 2003, PIJ asserted that it would not target Americans in spite of a U.S.
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indictment of eight PIJ activists (four of whom were living in the United States).313
 PIJ claimed that it would stay focused on its fight against Israel and that it wished
not to ‘open any new fronts’ by targeting U.S. interests.314  
Primary Area(s) of Operation. PIJ conducts its attacks in Israel, the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.  However, PIJ leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah reportedly
lives in and operates from Damascus, Syria.315  (Shallah took over the leadership
when Israeli forces killed Shiqaqi in 1994.)  The PIJ also has a presence in Beirut,
Tehran, and possibly Khartoum, where it raises money.316         
Strength and Composition. The exact number of PIJ members is unknown.
At the beginning of the first Intifada (1987-1990), PIJ reportedly consisted of as few
as 250 militants.317   The group has, however, increased its recruiting base over the
course of the 1990s and may now have more members, including students.    
Connections with Other Groups.  The PIJ’s closest ally is Hamas (see
entry above).  Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties, and in fact, some
analysts viewed them as rivals.318  Since 1994, the two groups have apparently
collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned
simultaneous bombings.  In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ
were being courted by Iran to coordinated their efforts and derail the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process.  Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply
connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.319  There have
also been numerous reports that Hamas provided training and logistical support from
Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.320  In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published
a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests.
Some analysts still see a rivalry between the groups, as both groups compete to
launch suicide attacks against Israeli targets.
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State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  The State Department has said
that PIJ receives financial support from Iran and logistical support from Syria.321  PIJ
leader Shallah has reportedly taken refuge in Syria.322
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Syria’s role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian
Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175.  This group has killed American civilians, and
eight of its members are under U.S. indictment; however, it has claimed that it does
not want to attack U.S. citizens and interests directly.  The PIJ is an extremely violent
group that uses suicide attacks and has killed a large number of Israeli civilians.    
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Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Goals and Objectives.The PLF is committed to the destruction of Israel and
the establishment of a Palestinian state on its territory. 
Brief History.  Originally formed in 1959 by Ahmed Jibril (PLFP-GC, see
entry below), the PLF has gone through several periods of splits and mergers.  In
1977, Jibril split off from the PFLP-GC and re-established the PLF as an independent
organization. The group’s most recent fissure occurred in the 1980’s when the PLF
split along pro-Syrian, pro-Libyan, and pro-PLO lines.  While all three groups claim
to represent the PLF, the pro-PLO faction of Muhammed Zaidan, known as Abu
Abbas, is responsible for the PLF’s most prominent terrorist acts.  
On Oct. 7, 1985 four PLF terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro
on its way from Egypt to Israel and became infamous for the murder of wheelchair-
bound US citizen Leon Klinghoffer.  In response to PLF demands, Italian authorities
released Abu Abbas from prison, later sentencing him to life in prison in absentia.
After the Achille Lauro incident, Tunisian authorities expelled the group which then
moved its headquarters to Iraq.  The group has not been blamed for a terrorist attack
since 1990, when it attempted a seaborne-commando raid of Israeli beaches at
Nizanim in an attempt to kill tourists and Israelis.  Israeli forces foiled the attack,
meant to avenge the deaths of seven Palestinian workers on May 20, killing four of
the twelve militants with no Israeli casualties.  At the time, Abu Abbas was a
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee member, and Israeli
officials used the raid to put pressure on the U.S. dialogue with the PLO, claiming
the raid was proof the PLO still engaged in terrorism.323
The PLF became active again in the al-Aqsa Intifada.  In November 2001, 15
Iraqi trained PLF militants were arrested by Israeli authorities for plotting attacks
inside Israel.  Israeli authorities claimed the group was linked to Iraqi intelligence,
and trained and supported by Baghdad324 On April 16, 2003, U.S. Special Forces
captured Abu Abbas in southern Baghdad.325 The Italian government has requested
his extradition so he may serve his sentence for the Achille Lauro incident.326
Favored Tactic.  The PLF has engaged in bombings, kidnappings, and
murders.  The group has also used hang gliders and hot-air balloons to attack
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Israel.327  The PLF has also attempted at least one seaborne assault on Israel, the 1990
attack on the beach at Nizanim.328
Anti-American Activity.  The PLF does not focus its energies on attacking
the United States or U.S. interests.  The exception was the murder of American
citizen Leon Klinghoffer on the Achille Lauro.
Primary Areas of Operation.  Abu Abbas has been based in Iraq since 1990
and the PLF has a presence in both Lebanon and the West Bank.329  While the 2003
U.S. invasion of Iraq did result in the capture of Abu Abbas, it remains unclear what
effect the occupation will have on PLF operations.
Strength and Composition.  The State Department lists the PLF’s strength
as unknown.  However other estimates place the Abu Abbas faction at around 300
to 500 members.330
Connections with Other Groups.  Abu Abbas has close relations to Yasir
Arafat and, consequently, close links with the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).331  There are no known links between the PLF and Al Qaeda.  Abu Abbas
condemned the September 11 attacks and stated Al Qaeda’s cause is separate from
the Palestinian cause.332
State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies.
Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the PLF received most of its
financial and logistical support from Iraq.  Also, the $25,000 rewards Saddam
Hussein was paying out to the families of suicide bombers in Palestinian territories
were allegedly disbursed by the PLF.333  
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  It is unclear what the status of the PLF is.  Its
leader Abu Abbas was captured during the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  It may be in a
period of disarray or transition.  
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Goals and Objectives.  The PFLP seeks the destruction of the State of Israel,
the establishment of a socialist Palestinian state and the end to American influence
in the region.
Brief History.  After the 1967 Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors, George
Habash, a medical doctor and a Christian, founded the PFLP as a more leftist leaning
organization bent on the destruction of Israel.  In the 1970’s the PFLP became one
of the first Palestinian movements to use terrorism to further its agenda and was the
second largest organization under the PLO.334  Unlike the PLO, the PFLP sought
support from the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the USSR’s
client state Syria.  Funding for the PFLP diminished with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but the group’s headquarters remain in Damascus.335 
 
The PFLP conducted numerous terrorist attacks in the 1970’s.  In its most
infamous attack, PFLP members highjacked a TWA Boeing 747, a Swissair DC-8,
and a BOAC VC-10, flew them all to Dawson Airfield outside Amman, Jordan, and
blew them up on the ground after unloading the hostages.336  In June of 1972, three
members of the Japanese United Red Army opened fire with machine guns and killed
26 people at Lod airport at the behest of the PFLP.337
In May of 2000, the ailing founder of the PFLP, George Habash, handed his
authority over to Abu Ali Mustafa, originally named Mustafa al-Zibri.  Since the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process floundered in September 2000 and the Al-Aqsa
Intifada erupted, the PFLP has carried out ten car bombings and numerous other
attacks.  In August 2001, Israeli helicopters launched a rocket attack against PFLP
headquarters and killed Mustafa.338  The PFLP retaliated by killing Rehavam Zeevi,
Israel’s Tourism Minister.  Mustafa was succeeded by Ahmed Saadat who was
arrested by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2002.  Followers of the PFLP have
threatened to kill PA figures if Saadat is not released.339
Favored Tactics.  The PFLP is most famous for its plane highjackings.  More
recently, the group has turned to car bombings, assassinations, and guerilla tactics.340
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Anti-American Activities.  The PFLP has not engaged in any direct attacks
on U.S. citizens or interests.
Primary Areas of Operation.  Headquarters for the PFLP are in Damascus,
Syria, and the group is believed to keep support bases in Lebanon.  They carry out
operations in Israel and the Palestinian territories.341
Strength and Composition.  The PFLP reportedly has around 800 to1,000
members.342
Connections with Other Groups.  The PFLP rejected the 1993 Oslo
Accords between Israel and the PLO and joined the Damascus-based Alliance of
Palestinian Forces (APF).  Within the APF, the PFLP enjoyed good relations with
other groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-General
Command (see entries).  However, the PFLP showed a willingness to negotiate with
Arafat by attending the 1996 Palestinian National Council, and thereby effectively
sealed a split between the PFLP and the APF. Bilateral relations with individual APF
members continue, especially with the more violent elements of the
Fatah movement.343 
State Sponsors, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies.
The PFLP receives safe haven and logistical support from Syria, and some financial
support from Iran.344
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  Syria’s role in aiding this group may be
an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175.  This group has
violently attacked Israeli civilians and will play a role in the viability of any Israeli-
Palestinian peace process.
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC)
Goals and Objectives.  The PFLP-GC is a Marxist-Leninist group with
Islamic beliefs committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the
destruction of Israel.  The group has been opposed to any negotiation with Israel and
believes only in a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.345
Brief History.  The history of the PFLP-GC is convoluted.  In 1959, Ahmed
Jibril, a former engineering captain in the Syrian army, founded the Palestine
Liberation Front, only to merge his group with George Habash’s Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine in 1967.  In 1968, finding himself at odds with both
Habash’s willingness to negotiate with Israel and his leanings away from Syria, Jibril
broke away from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC with headquarters in Damascus.
During the 1970’s, the PFLP-GC became more a proxy for Syria than an organization
of freedom fighters for the Palestinians, even going so far as to support Syria against
rival Palestinian factions in the Lebanese civil war in 1976.346 (During that fighting,
Abu Abbas broke away from the PFLP-GC to form the Palestine Liberation Front in
1977 - see entry above).  Furthermore, in 1983 the PFLP-GC sided again with Syria
and aligned with a renegade Fatah element to drive Arafat from Tunisia .347  
In the 1990s, with the decline of the Soviet Union and a tightening of Syria’s
budget, the PFLP-GC limited its activities to training and equipping other Palestinian
groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  In May 2001, the PFLP-GC
claimed responsibility for the attempted smuggling of 40-tons of weapons to the
Palestinian territories that were intercepted by Israel’s navy.348  Most recently, the
PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the killing of two Israeli soldiers in the West
Bank on November 18, 2003.349
Favored Tactics.  Known for its unusual tactics, the PFLP-GC has used hot
air balloons and hang-gliders to attack inside Israel.  Recently it has reverted to
bombings and guerilla tactics.350
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Anti-American Activity.  The PFLP-GC has not specifically targeted
American interests or citizens.  However, the group considers the United States an
enemy for its support of Israel.
Primary Areas of Operation.  The PFLP-GC operates in Israel, Lebanon,
Syria, and the Palestinian territories.351
Strength and Composition.  The Department of State estimates the group’s
strength at between 500-1,000, while other sources place the number of members
closer to 500.352
Connections with Other Groups.  The PFLP-GC is committed to the
Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) and has aligned itself more closely with the
fundamentalist Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas than other secular-leaning
groups.  This factor allows the PFLP-GC to act as a go-between for Islamist and
secular elements seeking to collaborate.353
The PFLP-GC prefers ties with states over other groups.  However, some
experts have reported varying connections with other Leftist and nationalist groups
in the 1980s including  the Japanese Red Army, The Red Army Faction, and the
Provisional Irish Republican Army.354
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Western intelligence
sources are convinced the PFLP-GC is principally supported and directed by Syria.355
However, while Syria is by far the group’s closest state sponsor, in the mid-1980s,
pilots from the PFLP-GC reportedly flew in the Libyan air force in Chad,356 and the
Libyan government supplied hang gliders the PFLP-GC used in aerial raids on
northern Israel.357 It is also reported that because of the PFLP-GC’s connections, the
group serves as a liaison between secular governments and fundamentalist
movements.
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  Syria’s role in aiding this group may be
an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175.  Its apparent
ties with Libya and possible role in the bombing of Pan Am 103 may also have
implications for U.S. interests.  This group has violently attacked Israeli civilians and
may play a role in the viability of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
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Names.  The Base, Qa’idat al-Jihad, Maktab al-Khidamat, International Islamic
Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah
li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin, Group for the Preservation of Holy Sites, Islamic
Army of the Liberation of Holy Places, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy
Shrines, Islamic Sal.358
Goals and Objectives.  Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization that carries out
its own terrorist acts as well as providing logistical and training support to other
extremist groups.  Al Qaeda seeks to destroy the regimes of Muslim countries it
deems as “non-Islamic” in order to establish a worldwide Islamic religious
government based on the ancient model of the Caliphates.  The groups believe the
United States and its allies are the single greatest roadblock to that goal and therefore
issued a proclamation calling for all Muslims to kill Americans - military or civilian -
in order to secure the expulsion of Western influence from the Muslim world.359
Following is a selection from the second fatwa (1998):
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque
[Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands
of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with
the words of Almighty God...We — with God’s help — call on every Muslim
who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to
kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find
it.360
Brief History.  The origins of Al Qaeda are rooted in the Afghan resistance to
the Soviet invasion from 1979-1989.  Believing that the war with the atheistic
Soviets was a holy battle between Islam and the infidel, Osama bin Laden, the son
of a wealthy Saudi contractor, traveled to Afghanistan to aid the fight.  At the time,
Afghanistan lacked both the infrastructure and manpower for a protracted war.  Bin
Laden joined forces with Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam, leader of the Palestinian
Muslim Brotherhood, to establish the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK- Afghan Services
Bureau) whose goal was to recruit Muslim fighters from around the world to fight in
Afghanistan.  Bin Laden paid for their transportation and training (he imported
specialists in guerilla warfare and other professionals), while Afghan local leaders
contributed land and resources.  
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Anywhere from 20,000 to 60,000 people, most of whom were not native
Afghans, received training and combat experience in Afghanistan.361  During the
Afghan war, the Central Intelligence Agency provided roughly $500 million a year
in material support to the Mujahedin, though there is no evidence that U.S. aid was
given to bin Laden himself.  In 1988, bin Laden, believing Azzam’s perspective to
be too narrow and limited, broke with his ally to form Al Qaeda (The Base) and carry
on his  jihad on a worldwide scale.  Azzam died in a car bombing in 1989, ostensibly
carried out by his Afghan rivals.362 
With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned
to Saudi Arabia to combat what he saw as an infidel Saudi government.  Further
angered by the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia accompanying the Gulf War, bin Laden
became even more outspoken in his anti-regime rhetoric.  With his immediate family
and a band of followers, he moved to Sudan.  His Saudi citizenship was revoked in
1994 for his opposition to the Saudi government.  In Sudan, bin Laden established
businesses, paved roads, built an airport, and created training camps to supply out-of-
work mujahedin with jobs.363  In 1996, as Sudanese relations with the United States
improved, the government of Sudan asked bin Laden to depart.  He then returned to
Afghanistan where he established his ties with the Taliban movement, followed by
training camps and a terrorist infrastructure.  This infrastructure supported a number
of plots against the United States and its citizens, including the bombings of the
African Embassies in 1998 and the September 11th, 2001 attacks.  Also in 2001, Al
Qaeda officially merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (see entry above).
In 2001, American-led forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Approximately half of the senior Al Qaeda leadership have been captured, the
group’s previous communications network has apparently been crippled, and its
Afghanistan base has been largely eliminated.  But Al Qaeda appears to have gone
through a transition, from a territorially-based, centrally-directed structure to a more
decentralized, mission-driven organization. Attacks in Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, and elsewhere have reportedly demonstrated the involvement of indigenous
groups linked to Al Qaeda and supported by its resources and/or technical advice.
Osama bin Laden remains at large, and Al Qaeda is still considered a major threat to
the United States.
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Favored Tactics.  Al Qaeda is most famous for its elaborate large-scale
bombings, although the group has also engaged in assassinations, guerilla warfare,
and suicide attacks.  The group also provides support to other terrorist organizations
and violent individuals throughout the world in the form of training, logistics, and
financial grants.364  Al Qaeda has also shown interest and some capability in chemical
and biological weapons, and interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.365
Anti-American Activity.  In February 1998, bin Laden issued a proclamation
announcing the creation of his new organization The World Islamic Front for Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders, which called on all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and
their allies (see above).366  Al Qaeda has been held directly responsible for or
variously linked with numerous terrorist attacks against United States citizens and
interests.  These include but are not limited to:  the August 1998 bombings of U.S.
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (at least 301 killed, 5,000
injured); the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen (17
killed, 39 injured); and the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Virginia and
Pennsylvania (approximately 3,000 people dead or injured).367     
Primary Areas of Operation.  Al Qaeda is a network with global reach.
Until the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan, that country was Al Qaeda’s base of
operation and held its logistical and training facilities.  Many of Al Qaeda’s leaders
have either been captured or have apparently fled to areas along the western border
of Pakistan.  Al Qaeda cells or collaborators have also been found in south Asia,
southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.368
Strength and Composition.  The exact size of Al Qaeda is unknown,
though the group likely has several thousand fighters.  The estimated number of
people who trained in camps or fought in Afghanistan ranges from 20,000369 to
60,000,370 but these are not all Al Qaeda “members.”  Many of Al Qaeda’s top
leadership have been killed, and some estimates put the number of killed or captured
Al Qaeda operatives since Sept. 11, 2001 at around 3,000.371  Some experts further
believe Al Qaeda can best be described as an organization in transition.  The losses
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of many of the group’s leaders and their base in Afghanistan have disrupted the
organization, but experts fear that Al Qaeda’s structure, which fostered an
entrepreneurial spirit in its lower-level fighters, can sustain the loss of senior
leaders.372
Connections with Other Groups.  Groups known to have connections with
Al Qaeda include: Islamic Group (Egypt), al-Jihad (Egypt),  Armed Islamic Group
(Algeria), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria), Abu Sayyaf Organziation
(Philippines), Harakat al-Mujahedin (Pakistan), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen), Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon), al Ittihad Islamiya
(Somalia), Jemaah Islamiya, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, among others.373
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Afghanistan under
the Taliban was the primary state supporter of Al Qaeda that provided a safe-haven
and allowed training camps to be established on its territory. 
Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Agency (ISI), through the support it gave to
the Taliban, can be said to have provided indirect support for Al Qaeda activities;
however, there is no evidence of direct support from the ISI to Al Qaeda.374  The
Bush administration has also claimed that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had direct
links to Al Qaeda, though their leverage and significance is subject to dispute.
During its early stage, Al Qaeda was funded by bin Laden’s personal fortune,
estimated by Swiss sources at between $50-300 million.375  Today, Al Qaeda
maintains legitimate businesses, solicits donations from supporters, and receives
funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.376  Some front businesses
date back to bin Laden’s time in the Sudan and include: a construction company, el-
Hijrah for Construction and Development Ltd., that built a highway linking
Khartoum to Port Sudan,377 and the el-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum.378  Also,
Al Qaeda is believed  to have used ostrich farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, tracts
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of forest  in Turkey, diamond trading in Africa and farms  in Tajikistan to finance its
operations.379
Originally Designated as an FTO.  Oct. 8, 1999.
Re-designated.  Oct. 5, 2001. 
Issues of Concern for Congress. This group continues to be an extremely
serious threat to the United States and its allies.  Given the global reach of Al Qaeda
and its network, Congressional oversight of U.S. counterterrorism policy will
continue to be important, not only in the military and intelligence fields, but also in
foreign policy, law enforcement, international cooperation, public diplomacy, foreign
homeland security, and other areas. 
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Real IRA (RIRA)
Goals and Objectives. The Real IRA is dedicated to expelling British troops
from Northern Ireland, which is part of the United Kingdom, and unifying the island
of Ireland.  RIRA split off from the original Irish Republican Army in 1997 because
the leadership of that group declared a cease fire and engaged in the peace process
in Northern Ireland.  RIRA opposes the peace process, and many believe its aim is
to embarrass the original IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, by derailing
negotiations and the peace process.380
Brief History.  RIRA was formed in 1997-1998 by hardliners within the IRA
who opposed the peace process in Northern Ireland that was being negotiated by
more moderate members of the IRA and Sinn Fein.  The group conducted a series of
attacks in 1998.  In August 1998, the group bombed the marketplace in Omagh, in
Northern Ireland, killing 29, including 9 children, and injuring over 200.381  The
bombing was so shocking and so widely condemned that the group declared a cease
fire, and claimed that it had not deliberately set out to kill civilians.  
In 2000, however, the group resumed its attacks, focusing on government and
military targets rather than civilians.  In 2000 and 2001, the group conducted
numerous attacks in Northern Ireland and London.  In March 2001, the group’s
leader, Michael (Mickey) McKevitt, was arrested.  In October 2002, McKevitt and
40 other imprisoned members declared that further armed resistence was futile and
that the RIRA was “at an end.”  Other members vowed to continue the group’s
efforts, however, and RIRA attacks continue sporadically.382
  
Favored Tactics. The Real IRA has conducted bombings, assassinations, and
robberies.  One tactic the group has employed is the bombing of town centers in an
effort to disrupt business and maximize the shock value of its attacks.  Since the
public outrage caused by the Omagh bombing, however, the group has tended to
focus its attacks on police and military targets in Northern Ireland as well as in
England.383
Anti-American Activities. The Real IRA has not directly targeted or attacked
U.S. interests.
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Areas of Operation. RIRA operates in Northern Ireland, other parts of the
United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland.
Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates RIRA’s
strength at 100 to 200 activists, plus possible support from members of the IRA who
are dissatisfied with the cease fire.384 
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  Irish and Middle
Eastern terrorist groups have a long tradition of exchanging expertise in bomb and
weapon-making, and the Real IRA is suspected to have continued this tradition.385
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. RIRA is suspected of
receiving support from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to
purchase weapons from U.S. dealers.   RIRA is also believed to have bought
sophisticated weapons in the Balkans386  and to have engaged in drug trafficking.387
Originally Designated as an FTO. May 16, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress. Alleged support for the RIRA from
sympathizers in the United States may be a concern for Congress.  Also, according
to the State Department, the RIRA has attempted to buy weapons from U.S. gun
dealers.388 
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Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Name(s).  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Goals and Objectives. FARC’s goal is to establish a Marxist state in
Colombia.  On its website, the groups says it aims “to overcome the great economic,
social, cultural, ethnic and political inequalities” in Colombia.389
Brief History. FARC was established in 1964 after a particularly bloody period
in Colombia’s history known as La Violencia (1948-1958).390  The violence ended
in 1958 with a reconciliation between key parties in the government.  Meanwhile,
landless rebels banded together under FARC, which was formally established as the
military wing of the Colombian Communist Party.  FARC has emerged to be what
the State Department describes as Colombia’s “oldest, largest, most-capable, and
best-equipped Marxist insurgency.”391 It has targeted both Colombian and foreign
interests (including U.S.), as well as military and civilian targets.  
FARC’s original leader, Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulando, still controls the group,
and has in the past agreed to negotiate cease-fire terms with the Colombian
government.  In 1999, these negotiations led President Andres Pastrana to grant
FARC autonomy over a Switzerland-size zone in southern Colombia.  Experts say
that FARC engaged in illicit behavior, including kidnapping, extortion, and drug
operations,  and that this behavior proliferated in the autonomous area.  In 2001, the
FARC killed 197 civilians.392  President Pastrana called off peace talks with FARC
in February 2002, after the group failed to cease attacks.  The president ordered
Colombian armed forces to reclaim the FARC-controlled area.  Peace talks between
FARC and the government have not progressed since the last failed attempt in 2002.
Favored Tactics. FARC practices a variety of tactics, including bombings,
kidnappings, hijackings, and mortar attacks.393
Anti-American Activities. FARC has been known to target U.S. citizens.
Experts say that since 1980, FARC (together with the National Liberation Army
(ELN)) has kidnapped more than 100 Americans, 13 of whom have been killed.  As
recently as February 2003, FARC rebels claimed to have shot down a U.S. plane
carrying four Pentagon contractors and a Colombian on an anti-drug operation.  The
rebels kidnapped three of the Americans and executed the fourth after their plane
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crash-landed near a site where FARC commanders were holding a meeting.394  FARC
has said that it will release the remaining hostages under the condition that Colombia
also release jailed FARC guerillas. 
On March 4, 1999, FARC assailants abducted and later killed three U.S.
humanitarian workers.  In a landmark decision, in May 2003, the Colombian
government extradited to the United States one of six FARC rebels suspected of
committing the murders.395  At this writing, Nelson Vargas Rueda is awaiting trial in
the United States.      
Primary Area(s) of Operation. FARC operates mainly in Colombia.
According to some analysts, FARC operates in about 40% of the country, and it has
recently claimed responsibility for terrorist activity in the capital city of Bogota.
There are also reports that FARC has encroached upon the borders of Venezuela,
Panama, and Ecuador.  It also reportedly maintains offices in Cuba, Mexico, and
Europe.396
Strength and Composition. The State Department has said that the FARC
consists of 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants.397  Some observers put the number
much higher at as many as 18,000 members.398
Connections with Other Groups. Some experts suspect that FARC may
have a connection with the Irish Republican Army.  This suspicion arose on August
11, 2001, when three of the IRA’s best explosives experts were caught traveling with
false passports in Bogotá, Colombia.  The three men claimed that they were visiting
FARC’s autonomous region in Colombia to observe the peace process; but traces of
explosives were found on their belongings and they were subsequently charged with
training FARC operatives.399  FARC has subsequently displayed more agility with the
use of bombs and its tactics and targeting have changed.  For example, the FARC
increased its use of car bombs and began attacking more economic and urban
targets.400  The FARC also increased the number and lethality of its attacks in 2001
and 2002, killing more than 400 Colombian soldiers and police in an 18 month-span.
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State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  Some analysts claim that
FARC may very well be “one of the richest, if not the richest, insurgent group in the
world.”401 FARC uses a variety of mechanisms to raise funds, including kidnapping
for ransom, extortion, and drug trafficking.  Drug operations may have yielded from
$100 million upwards to $1 billion.402  There is no public evidence to suggest that
FARC receives funding, arms, or training from foreign governments.403
Originally Designated as an FTO.  October 8, 1997.
Re-designated.  October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.
Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group has kidnapped and killed
numerous American citizens and poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in Colombia.
It is also very actively involved in drug trafficking and extortion, earning large
amounts of money.  It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government.
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Revolutionary Nuclei
Name(s). Revolutionary Nuclei/Epanastatiki Pirines.
Goals and Objectives. The Revolutionary Nuclei is a leftist terrorist group
opposed to the current Greek government, the European Union, NATO and the
United States.404
Brief History. Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) is a small, leftist, urban guerilla
group based in Greece.  The similarities in modus operandi between RN and another
now apparently dormant Greece-based group, the Revolutionary People’s Struggle
(ELA), have led analysts to believe that RN may have succeeded ELA.  ELA
emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the military junta governing Greece.  The
group espoused anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideologies, and often attacked
government and foreign establishments.405  ELA has not claimed an attack since
1995.
RN surfaced in 1996 when it began claiming bomb attacks on foreign banks and
state buildings in language that seemed similar to that used by the ELA.406  For
example, on May 11, 1997, RN attacked a Greek Coast Guard Office in Piraeus.407
In 1998, RN struck a series of Greek government targets, including Athens court
buildings and the office of a former Public Order Minister.408   In the same year, RN
bombed a Barclay’s Bank branch in Piraeus, without causing any casualties, but
severely damaging office equipment.409  In its most infamous attack, RN bombed the
Athens Intercontinental Hotel in March 1999 to protest NATO military action in
Yugoslavia; a Greek woman was killed and a man was seriously wounded.410  In
2000, RN bombed the offices of several Greek companies and attempted to bomb the
office of a former minister.  The targets have generally been associated with the
Greek government or the United States/European Union.  
RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, so there is some question
as to whether the group may have disbanded or become dormant.411
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Favored Tactics. RN assailants primarily plant small, makeshift bombs and
use timing devices to detonate the bombs or engage in arson attacks.  RN tends to
place warning calls to newspapers and police offices immediately prior to
commencing an attack.  The group generally strikes at obscure hours of the night. 
Anti-American Activities. In December 1996, RN claimed a bomb attack on
a Citibank branch in Athens.  No one was injured, but there was damage to the office
building.  RN similarly detonated a makeshift bomb at the entrance of a building that
had recently housed American Express offices.412  In its most recent attacks against
U.S. interests, RN again targeted Citigroup and also bombed the studio of a Greek-
American sculptor in November 2000.413  
Primary Area(s) of Operation.  RN operates in Athens, Greece and the
surrounding metropolitan area.
Strength and Composition. RN is believed to be a small group, although
the exact number of members is unknown.  Some estimates put membership at under
100.414  Members tend to espouse leftist ideologies and are believed to have anti-
establishment and anti-U.S./NATO/EU stances.415
Connections with Other Groups.  As stated above, because the former
ELA and RN apparently have shared a common political agenda, targeted similar
interests, and executed similar attacks, analysts believe that RN is a successor to the
group.  Former members of ELA may now be members of RN.416  This assertion has
not been publicly confirmed, however.  In addition, RN reportedly jointly launched
an attack on Athens court buildings on July 13, 1998 with Liberation Struggle, an
unknown group.417
State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding and Constituencies.
RN’s funding sources are unknown, but the State Department has said that the group
is likely “self-sustaining.”418
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  Recently the Greek government has
aggressively pursued measures against Greek terrorist organizations, especially 17
November (see below).  As the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the
question of whether RN/ELA will target Western interests and Western citizens may
be of concern.
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Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17)
Goals and Objectives. 17 November is a tiny anti-Western, leftist terrorist
organization that opposes the Greek establishment, Greek ties to the United States
and the EU, and the Turkish presence in Cyprus.  The group seeks the removal of
U.S. military bases from Greece.  It apparently derives its anti-American stance from
U.S. backing of the Greek military junta that ruled the country from 1967 to 1974.419
Brief History.  17 November formed in 1975 and conducted more than 100
high profile attacks in Greece since then, killing a total of 23 people.  The group
attacked the Greek government as well as foreign government and private targets.
In the summer of 2002, with the help of the FBI and Scotland Yard, Greek police
arrested 14 members, including several key leaders.  The arrests were very important,
representing the first significant headway by the government against the group in
over 26 years.  As a result, Greek authorities have declared victory over 17
November; but the group has since issued a statement declaring that it is “still alive.”
The Greek government is especially concerned about 17 November as the
country  prepares for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens.  The group had
contributed to an impression among foreigners that Greece is unsafe, and the Greek
government hopes that the 2002 arrests and 2003 convictions demonstrate a dramatic
reduction in the threat and a serious national commitment to security.420 
 
Favored Tactics. 17 November tends to favor symbolic attacks rather than
attacks designed to coerce or cripple the Greek government or foreign interests.421
Its attacks have involved assassinations and bombings.
Anti-American Activities.  Four of the 23 killed in 17 November attacks
have been U.S. citizens.  In 1975, the group assassinated Richard Welch, CIA station
chief in Athens.422  The group’s statements attack the United States and ties between
Greece and the United States.
Areas of Operation. 17 November operates in Greece, primarily in Athens.
Strength and Composition. The group’s strength is unknown, according to
the State Department, but is presumed to be small.423  Other sources estimate its
strength at 20 or fewer members, many related to one another, and no more than 100
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supporters.424  A number of arrests in 2002 may have crippled the group and
substantially reduced its numbers.  Arrested members of the group have been
strikingly ordinary, including school teachers, shop keepers, and a telephone
operator, all of whom led ostensibly mundane lives in mainstream society.425
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. 17 November has no
known ties to other terrorist group.426
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group is believed
to fund itself through bank robberies.427
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  While the Greek government has
apparently made great strides in arresting members of this group and potentially
crippling it, as the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the question of its
operating capability will loom large.  
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Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F)
Names.  DHKP/C, Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, and Revolutionary Way.
Goals and Objectives.  The RPLP/F is an anti-Western Marxist group
determined to rid Turkey of Western influence in order to turn it into a socialist state.
The group regards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as imperialistic and is opposed
to Turkey’s membership in NATO.428
Brief History.  Founded in 1978 as an offshoot of the Turkish People’s
Liberation Party, the RPLP/F (originally Devrimci Sol or Dev Sol) began as a
national political movement and turned into a terrorist organization.  The “Party”
refers to the group’s political wing, while the “Front” refers to its military operations.
The RPLP/F began its terrorist career by assassinating current and retired
prominent Turkish  officials, including the 1980 assassination of former premier
Nihat Emir.429  From 1981-1983, years of a military junta, the Turkish government
managed to curtail the group’s activities.  However, by the late 1980’s, the RPLP/F
had recovered enough to carry out three simultaneous bombings against American
economic interests (see below) and assassinate a former chief of the Turkish National
Intelligence Agency in Istanbul.430  Throughout the 1990’s, the RPLP/F intensified
its anti-Western activity but also developed internal factions.431 Group members
claimed the murder of a British businessman in Ankara in 1991, and in 2001
detonated a pipe bomb in a crowd of New Year’s Eve celebrants, injuring ten.432
Favored Tactics.  The RPLP/F has engaged in targeted assassinations, rocket
attacks, and bombings. 
Anti-American Activity.  The RPLP/F has been anti-American since its
founding and has attacked American officials and civilians.  For example, in
February 1990, RPLP/F assassinated two Defense Department Contractors to protest
the Gulf War.  A month later the group shot and injured a U.S. Air Force officer near
Izmir.  In 1992, RPLP/F members fired a rocket at the U.S. Consulate in Ankara
which produced no casualties.433
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Primary Areas of Operation.  The RPLP/F is located in Turkey with
headquarters in Germany.  Within Turkey, the group is based around the Aegean
region.  Attempts to move the group toward the Mediterranean were limited by the
government.434
Strength and Composition.  Unknown.
Connections with Other Groups.  The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK or
KADEK) provided a safe haven for the RPLP/F in Southeast Anatolia in the Black
Sea region.  The two groups signed a protocol in 1996 that would deepen cooperation
between the two groups435  However, cooperation has since broken down.  (See PKK
entry, above.) 
State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies.
The RPLP/F has no known state supporters.  It reportedly maintains fund raising
operations in Western Europe.436
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  This group has violently attacked
Americans and American interests.  It is opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan.  It has assassinated Turkish, American, and British officials, though not
since the early 1990s.  
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Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
Goals and Objectives. GSPC is a well-organized radical Islamic group in
Algeria that aims to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law.
Brief History.  GSPC formed when an estimated 600 militants split off from
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA, see entry above) in 1996 during the bloody Algerian
civil war.  The group renounced GIA’s massacres of civilians in the mid-1990s and
promised a better organized campaign against the government and the military.  By
1998, GSPC had apparently eclipsed GIA in power and popularity.  By 2000, the
group appeared to have taken over GIA’s networks in Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa.437  European officials have linked GSPC to numerous plots in Europe.
Within Algeria, the group has reportedly been weakened by a government
crackdown; however, it continues to attack soldiers and officials, with the frequency
and violence of the attacks increasing noticeably in the summer of 2003.  According
to the U.S. State Department, GSPC is the most effective armed group remaining in
Algeria.
Favored Tactics.  The tactics of the GSPC are quite varied.  Within Algeria,
GSPC stages well-planned and executed ambushes of soldiers and officials.
Beginning February 22, 2003, the group kidnapped several groups of European
tourists in the Sahara desert (31 people in all; 30 were later freed, one perished),
apparently seeking weapons and money.438  It has set up roadblocks in remote
regions, charging fees to passers-by.  In Europe, the group is suspected of
involvement in several major bombing plots.
Anti-American Activities.  Shortly after 9/11, a GSPC leader threatened to
retaliate should the United States interfere in Algeria or disrupt its overseas
networks.439  The group was suspected of plotting to blow up U.S. embassies in Paris
and Rome in early 2002.  In May 2003, African authorities foiled a plot to bomb the
U.S. embassy in Mali.  Documents found in Mali connected the plot to GSPC.440
Areas of Operation. The group’s primary focus and area of operation is
Algeria.  Its main bases in Algeria have been in the mountainous regions east of
Algiers.  GSPC is also believed to maintain a network throughout Western Europe,
the Middle East, and North Africa.  Individuals and cells connected to GSPC have
been arrested across Western Europe.
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Strength and Composition. GSPC is comprised mainly of Algerian Islamic
fundamentalists.  Algerian authorities estimate that it has between 100 and 300
militants.441  According to the Algerian government,  military raids and a recent
amnesty period have reduced the group’s numbers in Algeria.442  European authorities
have arrested more than 100 people with suspected GSPC ties, but the effect of these
arrests on the group’s ability to operate is unknown.
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  GSPC is believed to
have extensive operational ties to Al Qaeda.  According to one account, half of those
arrested in Europe suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been Algerians also associated
with GSPC.  In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced the arrest of a Yemeni Al
Qaeda official who had been meeting with GSPC members in Algeria.443 
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  GSPC’s funding
appears to come mainly from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe, particularly
in France, and elsewhere.  In Algeria, the group has also used kidnapping and
smuggling to raise funds.  The Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of
supporting Algerian extremists in years past.444  The GSPC was said to have been
paid millions of dollars in ransom before most of the kidnapped European tourists
were freed.  (One person reportedly died of exposure.)  Some media reports suggest
Germany paid the ransom; others say Libya.445  These reports have not been
confirmed.  Still other sources claim that the hostages were not ransomed but freed
in a commando raid.446  
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  The GSPC’s extensive operational ties
to Al Qaeda make this group of particular concern to the United States.  Its
apparently extensive networks in networks in Europe, the Middle East, and North
Africa may provide an avenue for further attacks carried out on behalf of, or with
links to, Al Qaeda.  
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Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)
Name(s).  Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, SL.
Goals and Objectives. Shining Path is a leftist organization in Peru.  Its
original goal was to overthrow the government and social structure of Peru and
neighboring countries and replace them with a Maoist socialist system controlled by
the indigenous peoples of the region.  The group also opposes any foreign influence
in Peru.
Brief History. SL was formed in the late 1960s by former university professor
Abimael Guzman as a splinter group from the Communist Party of Peru.  Although
the group worked to bring about a Maoist revolution in Peru, its campaign did not
turn into an armed conflict until 1980 when the group began to murder local officials
in rural areas and assume their functions.   During the 1980s and early 1990s, the
group conducted numerous attacks in Peru, taking rural regions under its command.
It was known for excessive brutality in bringing under its power the peasants in these
regions.  Indeed, SL has been responsible for one of the most violent terrorist
insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere; at least 30,000 people have died since the
group took up arms.447 Areas that came under SL control included prime coca-
growing regions, and the group acquired much of its funding by protecting the coca
farmers from government eradication programs.448  
The 1992 capture of the charismatic Guzman and a subsequent government
crackdown sharply reduced the group’s capabilities.  While in prison, Guzman urged
followers to end their campaign against the government.  One faction heeded the call
for cease fire, while another did not.  In March 2002, just before President Bush
visited Peru, a car bomb exploded near the U.S. Embassy, killing nine people and
wounding thirty.  Some observers believe that the group has recently begun to
reconstitute itself after years of decline.449    
In August of 2003, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee released its
report to the public stating that upwards of 69,000 people died in the struggle
between the Shining Path and government security forces.450  The report highlights
the extreme brutality of the war and places blame on all sides. 
 
Favored Tactics.  Shining Path has favored car bombings and assassinations,
as well as massacres using machetes.  
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Anti-American Activities.  The group opposes any foreign influence in Peru,
including that of the United States.  In 1990, it attempted to bomb the U.S. Embassy
in Lima using a car bomb.  SL is also believed to be responsible for a 2002 car bomb
attack near the U.S. Embassy three days before a visit to Lima by President George
W. Bush.451  
Areas of Operation.  The group operates almost exclusively in Peru, and
mainly in rural areas.
Strength and Composition.  The State Department estimates the group’s
current strength at 400 to 500 members.452  Its strength has been reduced sharply by
arrests and defections; at its highpoint in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the group
fielded as many as 10,000 militants, according to some accounts.  The U.S. State
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, states that membership has begun
to grow recently, perhaps because SL has become more heavily involved in narco-
trafficking.453  
Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations.  Shining Path is not
known to have ties with other terrorist organizations.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  SL is not funded or
supported by any foreign state.  It receives much of its financing from coca farmers,
who pay the group to protect them from government eradication programs.  The
groups also finances itself through robberies and extortion.454
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  The question of whether the Shining
Path could be reconstituting itself, even in a weaker form, has potential implications
for the security of Western citizens and interests, as well as the future stability of the
Peruvian government.  Shining Path’s involvement in narco-trafficking is also a
worrisome element.
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United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Name(s).  Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the “Paramilitaries.”
Goals and Objectives. Founded in 1997, the AUC is an umbrella
organization for right-wing paramilitary groups which first began forming in the
1980s in order to protect the economic interests of wealthy land owners and combat
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army
(ELN) insurgents locally.455
Brief History.  The AUC was founded by brothers Fidel and Carlos Castano
in 1997.  Groups subsumed by the AUC are believed to include: the Peasant Self-
Defense Group of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), the Eastern Plains Self-Defense
Group, the Cesar Self-Defense Group, the  Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group,
Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group,
the Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group, the Pacific Bloc (including the “Frente
Calima” in and around Cali), the Southern Bloc, and the”Frente Capital” forming in
Bogota.456  
The AUC targets real and perceived supporters of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as
political activists, police officials and judges.  The group is known for its brutality
and has killed more civilians than the leftist insurgencies have killed: in 2001, the
AUC killed at least 1,015 civilians, compared to the 197 civilians killed by the
FARC.  The AUC also committed over 100 massacres in 2001, a tactic it used to
displace large portions of the peasant population in order maintain firmer control
over the major coca-growing lands.  The U.S. State Department noted that the AUC
was responsible for about 43 percent of Colombia’s internally displaced people in
2001.457   Co-founder Carlos Castano claims that drug- related activity supplies 70
percent of AUC’s funding, while the rest is donated by sponsors.458  
In 2001, Castano stepped down as head of military operations to devote more
time to the political activities of the AUC.  In 2002, the AUC signed a cease fire and
is engaged in peace talks with the Colombian government.  In July 2003, citing
government progress in combating the ELN and FARC, the AUC agreed to
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demobilize.459  In November 2003, a paramilitary group of some 850 members based
near Medellin formally demobilized.460
Favored Tactics.  The AUC has carried out indiscriminate bombing
campaigns, assassinations, massacres of entire villages, and guerilla warfare.461
Anti-American Activities.  The AUC specifically avoids American personnel
or interests.  However, human rights abuses and known ties to narcotics trafficking
may have earned the AUC a place on the FTO list.
Primary Areas of Operation.  AUC forces operate in the northwest
Colombian departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar.462  Their
presence has also been noted in the north and southwest, and fighting with FARC in
2000 in Putuyamo show AUC’s willingness to battle FARC throughout the country.
Strength and Composition.  The AUC membership has tripled in the last
three years, with a reported strength of anywhere from 6,000 to 15,000 fighters.463 
Connections with Other Groups.  The AUC has no known connections
with other terrorist groups.  However, the group is intricately tied with Colombia
drug producers.
State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding.  There is no known
direct relationship between the AUC and a state sponsor.  However, there have been
accusations that paramilitary organizations receive support from Colombia’s armed
forces.  Concerned that close collaboration between paramilitary and military forces
was putting U.S. military aid to Colombia in the hands of the AUC, the U.S.
government ordered the Armed Forces of Colombia to sever all ties with the AUC
in order to qualify for U.S. aid.464
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Issues of Concern for Congress.  The relationship between the Colombian
government and paramilitary groups has been a serious concern of Congress in the
past because of the possibility that U.S. dollars might end up supporting the AUC.
The Colombian government’s severing of those ties would remove this risk;
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